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ABSTRACT 
A Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) is a blank check company with no business 
operation but management quality. It raises money through unit IPO and put proceeds in a trust 
account for future business combination. In the post IPO market, the market price would reflect the 
value of trust account and management quality of profitably acquiring a firm with business operation. 
Thus, SPACs provide a unique setting to examine the pricing of management quality. Compared with 
regular IPO firms, SPAC management has more industry experience and the market put a higher value 
for SPACs with better management experience. SPACs with higher market value for management 
experience take less time to consummate business combination and have better long-term unit price 
performance. The results imply that management experience is valuable and has a significant effect on 
the performance of IPO or business combination. Also, shorter time to deal or better long-term unit 
price performance during IPO or business combination period leads to better unit return performance 
or more institutional interest of SPAC business combination. The results are consistent with the 
merger-driven IPO literature.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
A Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) is a blank check company with no business 
operation but management quality and reputation. Individuals, who generally possess merger and 
acquisition experience and who specialize in a specific industry, form a management team and hire an 
investment bank to underwrite an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to form a shell company. Then, within 
18 to 24 months, they identify a reverse merger target as indicated in their prospectus. The IPO 
proceeds are stored in a trust account and invested in risk-free securities, such as Treasury bills, until 
the merger deal receives approval. If they receive approval from their shareholders, they use the IPO 
proceeds to consummate the deal. If they cannot receive approval from their shareholders, then the IPO 
proceeds goes back to the shareholders. So, the structure of the SPAC IPO itself contains an investor 
protection device. As we can see from the definition of a SPAC deal, management quality and 
reputation is the key to the success of the deal.  
The role of institutional investors, venture capitalists and underwriters in explaining the IPO 
pricing mechanism has been widely debated in the literature (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991; Carter and Manaster, 1990). However, not much finance literature focuses on the 
role of a firm’s management quality and reputation in explaining the mechanism. Recently, 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) empirically examine the relationship between the firm’s management 
quality or reputation and IPO characteristics or post-IPO performance. They find that superior 
management quality and reputation results in larger IPO offer size, attracts more reputable 
underwriters and institutional investors, reduces underwriting expenses and IPO underpricing and 
increases post-IPO long-term stock returns and operating performance. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) 
measure management quality and reputation by looking at management team characteristics, education 
and experience. However, the role of management quality and reputation in explaining IPO pricing 
mechanisms is limited to the case of the common stock IPO. Investors invest in a common stock IPO 
not only by looking at management quality and reputation but also by looking at the performance of 
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the firm’s business operation. Common stock IPO underpricing reflects not only the market value of 
management quality and reputation but also that of the business operation. However, this is not the 
case for a SPAC. The role of management quality and reputation in explaining IPO characteristics, 
such as underwriter reputation or offering costs, should be different between common stock IPO and 
SPAC IPO.  
The first objective of this study is to better understand the market value of management quality 
and reputation and its role in explaining IPO pricing mechanism through SPAC IPO. First, we explain 
how the market value of management quality and reputation is reflected in SPAC IPO underpricing. 
Second, we empirically investigate the relationship between SPAC IPO characteristics, including 
SPAC IPO underpricing, and SPAC management quality and reputation.  
A substantial number of papers document the evidence of possible links between IPO activity 
and business combinations in terms of motivation of IPO (Schultz and Zaman, 2001; Brau and Fawcett, 
2006) or timing of IPO (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). More specifically, a private bidder considering a 
stock merger could decide to go public to reduce asymmetric information (Hansen, 1987; Fishman, 
1989; Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990). Recently, Lyandres, Zhdanov and Hsieh (2008) 
theoretically predict the increasing IPO activity before business combination reduces valuation 
uncertainty. Also, they predict that the time between the IPO and the business combination is expected 
to be increasing in the degree of valuation uncertainty. Finally, their model implies that an IPO could 
be a way of raising cash to facilitate future business combinations. Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani 
(2008) argue that IPOs facilitate acquisitions by mitigating valuation uncertainty of the firm.  
The second objective of this study is to better understand the relationship among IPO 
characteristics (including management quality and reputation), the success of business combination 
and institutional interest. First, we empirically investigate the relationship between management 
quality and reputation or IPO underpricing and the success characteristics of SPAC business 
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combinations. Second, we look at the relationship among such characteristics, abnormal returns around 
business combinations and institutional interest.  
Our main findings are as follows. Compared with regular IPO firms, SPAC management has 
more experience and the market puts a higher value for SPACs with better management experience 
through IPO underpricing. Also, higher management experience leads to higher offer size and lower 
offering expenses excluding underwriter spread. SPACs with higher market value for management 
experience take less time to consummate business combinations. SPAC IPO underpricing leads to 
higher long-term stock return performance from SPAC business combination announcement until 
consummation. There are positive cross-sectional relationships among time-to-deal, long-term unit 
price performance and abnormal returns around SPAC business combination announcement or 
consummation. Specifically, shorter time-to-deal and better long-term unit price performance leads to 
higher abnormal returns around SPAC business combination consummation. Also, better long-term 
unit price performance attracts more institutional interest.  
The contributions of this study are as follows. First, it contributes to the IPO literature in the 
sense that management experience is valuable through underpricing and related to IPO characteristics 
and the success of business combination. Second, it links the IPO underpricing to the success of 
business combination which is consistent with the firm quality signaling theory of IPO underpricing. 
Finally, it links post-IPO unit price performance or time to deal to the stock return performance or 
institutional interest of SPAC business combination. The result is consistent with merger-driven IPO 
literature. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE MARKET VALUE OF MANAGEMENT QUALITY: 
IMPLICATION WITHIN SPAC IPO PRICING SETTING 
We introduce the new implication of the market value of management quality in the following 
manner.  
iiimgt CpricePTAMV =+,  
where imgtMV ,  is the market value of management quality for each SPAC i, iCprice  is the first 
day unit closing price for each SPAC i, iPTA  is the proceeds per unit in trust account for each SPAC i. 
Given no business operations, the market value of SPAC consists of the proceeds in trust account and 
the market value of management quality. So, the difference between the first day unit price and the per 
unit proceeds in the trust account gives us the market value of management quality per unit. Since the 
market value of management quality is measurable as part of the first day unit closing price, we expect 
the positive relationship between management quality and SPAC IPO underpricing because 
underpricing increases with the first day unit closing price given unit offer price. 
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CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
3.1 Management Quality and Reputation vs. SPAC IPO Characteristics 
The IPO underpricing puzzle is widely debated in the finance literature. There are numerous 
explanations for IPO underpricing and two conflicting explanations exist with different assumptions 
about the asymmetric information. The initial explanation is beginning with Rock (1986). His 
asymmetric information model assumes that some investors are better informed about the true value of 
the shares on offer than are the investing public, issuing firms or underwriters. Informed investors keep 
crowding out uninformed in the primary market but still their participation is expected because 
informed investors cannot take up all the shares offered. So, uninformed investors should at least 
break-even on average to participate in the market, leading to expected underpricing in all IPOs. 
Collectively, firms benefit from underpricing because they attract capital from uninformed investors 
through their continued participation in the IPO market. However, underpricing is costly for an 
individual firm. Therefore, they have incentives to reduce it by reducing the information asymmetry 
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993; Welch, 1989). Recently, Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005) argue that management quality reduces this information asymmetry of common stock IPO, 
leading to reduced IPO underpricing. So, there should be a negative relationship between management 
quality and common stock IPO underpicing.  
However, with a different asymmetric information assumption between issuing firms and 
investors, we can interpret underpricing differently. If companies have better information about the 
present value or risk of their future cash flows than do investors, underpricing can be used as firm 
quality signaling (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). Recently, 
Zheng and Stangeland (2007) document that IPO firm quality, measured by the post-IPO growth in 
sales and EBITDA, is positively correlated with IPO underpricing. They argue that the result supports 
the notion that IPO firms with greater underpricing are of better quality. 
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We discuss that the market value of management quality is measurable as part of the first day 
unit closing price of SPAC IPO and expect positive relationship between management quality and 
SPAC IPO underpricing. The positive relationship is explained by above-mentioned IPO firm quality 
signaling argument. If the management quality represents the IPO firm quality for certain firms, such 
as SPAC IPO, it should be positively correlated with IPO underpricing. Especially, the argument 
applies to SPAC IPO because SPAC is a blank check company and it does not have any operations 
during the IPO process. So, the only firm quality signaling feature is the management quality. Also, it 
has an incentive to signal firm quality to outside investors to obtain their approval for future business 
combination. For common stock IPO firms, there are many other ways to signal their firm quality than 
the management quality because they are operating firms. Also, they do not have any incentives to 
signal firm quality through a “qualified” management team because they are not obliged to succeed in 
future business combinations led by such a team. So, we don’t expect the positive relationship between 
the management quality and underpricing for common stock IPO. 
Also, the success of SPAC IPO depends on the quality management team who establishes the 
blank check company, especially their industry experience, and many SPAC specialists suspect its 
relation with stock price fluctuation around SPAC IPO and business combination period. 
“…Investors are entrusting more and more money into the hands of talented SPAC 
management teams in the hopes that the SPAC might find a lucrative acquisition in a specified 
sector… …Investors entrust an ‘experienced’ founding management team to seek out and consummate 
a value-building acquisition of an operating business…” 
-‘SPACs Continuing To Grow And Evolve’ by M. Ridgway Barker and Randi-Jean G. Hedin, 
Kelly Drye & Warren LLP- 
“… We’re seeing higher-quality management teams with proven ‘track’ records that are 
extremely interested in this vehicle…” 
-Ciaran O’Kelly, Head of U.S. equities at Banc of America Securities- 
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We set up a hypothesis based on the argument above.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the SPAC management quality and 
underpricing of SPAC IPO. 
According to Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), better and more reputable managers may be able 
to select positive NPV projects, indicating a larger equilibrium scale of investment, thus induce a 
larger IPO offer size. As a SPAC has nothing but quality management team, SPAC IPO should induce 
a large IPO offer size.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the SPAC management quality and 
SPAC IPO offer size.  
Firms with higher management quality and reputation attract top-tier underwriters (Chemmanur 
and Paeglis, 2005). Management quality and reputation reduces information asymmetry between firms 
going public and outside investors, as top-tier underwriters are supposed to do. So, it is easier for 
underwriters to attract outside investors with the help of a reputable management team. By the same 
logic, the quality management team of SPAC should attract top-tier underwriters, and underwriter 
reputation is positively correlated with the management quality and reputation. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the SPAC management quality and the 
top-tier underwriter dummy of SPAC IPO. 
Given the reduced information asymmetry generated by quality management team through its 
certification, underwriters and other intermediaries might incur lower costs, underwriting spread and 
other offering costs, in acquiring and transmitting information about firms going public. Also, the 
reduction in outsiders’ information acquisition costs for firms with quality management could also lead 
to greater institutional interest in the IPOs of such firms (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). By the same 
logic, the quality management team of SPAC should incur lower costs and greater institutional interest. 
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Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between the SPAC management quality and the 
underwriter spread or offering expenses of SPAC IPO. There is a positive relationship between the 
SPAC management quality and the institutional holdings or number of institutions after SPAC IPO. 
3.2 Management Quality, Underpricing and the Success of Business Combinations 
When we apply the above-mentioned asymmetric information argument (Hansen, 1987; 
Fishman, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990) or valuation uncertainty argument (Lyandres, 
Zhdanov and Hsieh, 2008; Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani, 2008) to SPAC IPO and its future 
business combination, management quality and underpricing is the way to reduce asymmetric 
information or valuation uncertainty by signaling SPAC quality to outside investors. The IPO literature 
documents underpricing as a signal of firm quality (Ibbotson, 1975; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; 
Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). We argue that the market value of management quality is 
part of SPAC IPO pricing setting, and management quality is the signaling device of SPAC quality 
consistent with the positive relationship between management quality and underpricing. Based on an 
asymmetric information or valuation uncertainty argument and the IPO literature, management quality 
or underpricing signals SPAC firm quality, reduces asymmetric information or valuation uncertainty 
and facilitates future business combination. The success of the future business combination will be 
highly likely with the ratio of successful business combinations to ones in progress, better long-term 
unit price performance from IPO consummation until business combination and shorter time to deal 
from IPO until business combination. So, we set up following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between SPAC IPO underpricing and the ratio of 
successful business combinations to ones in progress or the long-term unit price performance from IPO 
consummation until business combination. There is a negative relationship between SPAC IPO 
underpricing and time to deal from IPO until business combination. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between SPAC management quality and the ratio 
of successful business combinations to ones in progress or the long-term unit price performance from 
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IPO consummation until business combination. There is a negative relationship between SPAC 
management quality and time to deal from IPO until business combination. 
The valuation uncertainty or asymmetric information argument will disappear as the success 
probability of future business combination increases. Shorter time to deal and better long-term unit 
price performance will increase the success probability of future business combination, resulting in 
better stock return performance around SPAC business combination. As SPAC business combination 
involves the acquisition of a private company with promising investment opportunities, it will attract 
more institutional investors if the success probability of such business combination increases. So, we 
set up a following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 7: Shorter time to deal or better long-term unit price performance during IPO and 
business combination period leads to higher abnormal return around SPAC business combination 
announcement or consummation. Also, better long-term unit price performance leads to more 
institutional interest after business combination consummation. 
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CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Data 
The Reverse Merger Report from DealFlow Media is used for SPAC IPO characteristics 
information and we verify the information from Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) S-1 or 
424B documents (SIC=6770). The stock price data is from Over The Counter (OTC) bulletin board 
and http://www.eoddata.com1. If the stock goes public through American Stock Exchange, we verify 
the stock price through Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The sample period is 
from August 2003 through February 2008. The sample consists of 151 firms and 158 SPAC offerings2. 
We also construct a matched sample of common stock IPO. We construct each sample by 
matching the gross proceeds and date. Since the total number of IPO is limited, the gross proceeds and 
date do not exactly match for each IPO. So, we selected the matched common stock IPO with the 
closest gross proceeds amount and date. The date of matched common stock issue is limited to one 
month before and after the SPAC issue date. The SDC Platinum database or 
http://www.ipo.nasdaq.com is used for common stock IPO characteristics information and we also 
verify the information from Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) S-1 or 424B documents. The 
sample period for matched common stock IPO for SPAC issues is from August 2003 through February 
2008. The sample consists of 158 common stock offerings. For the institutional holdings or the number 
                                                 
1
 The reason we use two different stock price data sources is because the stock price information of some earlier SPACs is 
not on current OTC bulletin board but in http://www.eoddata.com. We verify the stock price information in this website 
with Bloomberg. Both the website and Bloomberg extract stock price information from major exchanges and professional 
employees for each company clean the stock price data. Both the website and Bloomberg do not extract stock price 
information from each other. So, we think it is safe to verify the stock price information of the website with Bloomberg.    
2
 Seven firms issued two different SPAC offerings. Trinity Partners Acquisition Co. offered series A unit (ticker=TPQCU) 
and series B unit (ticker=TPQCZ). Mercator Partners Acquisition Corp. offered series A unit (ticker=MPAQU) and series B 
unit (ticker=MPABU). Juniper Partners Acquisition Corp. offered series A unit (ticker=JNPPU) and series B unit 
(ticker=JNPPZ). Good Harbor Partners Acquisition Corp. offered series A unit (ticker=GHBAU) and series B unit 
(ticker=GHBBU). Global Services Partners Acquisition Corp. offered series A unit (ticker=GSPAU) and series B unit 
(ticker=GSPBU). Israel Growth Partners Acquisition Corp. offered series A unit (ticker=IGPAU) and series B unit 
(ticker=IGPBU). Middle Kingdom Alliance Corp. offered series A unit (ticker=MKGDU) and series B unit 
(ticker=MKGBU).  Each series A or B unit consists of common stock, class W warrant, class Z warrant or warrant. The 
difference between class W warrant and class Z warrant is the expiration period. For example, for Trinity Partners 
Acquisition Co., the class W warrants will expire on July 29, 2009, or earlier upon redemption, while the class Z warrants 
will expire on July 29, 2011, or earlier upon redemption. 
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of institutions after the IPO (instp, instn), SPAC business announcement (instpa, instna) or 
consummation (instpc, instnc), we use 13-F and 13 F-E filings from WRDS (Wharton Research Data 
Services) database. For the underwriter reputation, we use the reputation ranking of Carter and 
Manaster (1990) to calculate the top-tier underwriter dummy. 
For the success indicator, time to deal or unit price performance of SPAC business combination, 
we use a reduced sample. From 158 SPAC IPO sample, we select the subsample of SPAC which 
consummated business combination (53 SPAC IPOs, 49 SPACs) to calculate time to deal or stock 
return performance from IPO till business combination. Unit price performance is calculated by 
calculating Fama and Macbeth (1973) regression alpha of monthly average unit return on monthly 
Carhart (1997) four factors. Four factors information is from Kenneth R. French website. Also, we 
calculated the unit Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) around the announcement and consummation 
of SPAC business combination. We use the Brown and Warner (1985) procedure to calculate the 
abnormal return. Also, we divided SPAC IPO sample into three parts: ones consummated business 
combination (53 SPAC IPOs, 49 SPACs), ones liquidated (23 SPAC IPOs, 21 SPACs) and ones in 
progress (84 SPAC IPOs, 81 SPACs) to calculate the success indicator of business combination3. The 
sample period to calculate the success indicator is from March 2004 till November 2008. Success 
indicator is equal to one if SPAC consummated business combination, is equal to two if SPAC 
liquidated, and is equal to three if SPAC business combination is in progress. Table 1 shows the 
number of IPOs by year. 
Table 1 Number of IPO by year 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
SPAC 1 13 30 40 66 8 158 
Matched-Common 1 13 30 41 68 5 158 
        
Final Sample 2 26 60 81 134 13 316 
 
                                                 
3
 For ones liquidated, two SPACs (Shanghai Century Acquisition Corporation, ticker: SHA.U and Phoenix India 
Acquisition Corporation, ticker: PXIAU) announce two different targets for business combinations at two different periods. 
That’s why 23 SPAC IPOs (21 SPACs) are categorized as ones liquidated.  
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4.2 Variable Construction 
There are two empirical analyses in this study. First, we look at the relationship between 
management quality, reputation and SPAC IPO characteristics. Second, we investigate the relationship 
between management quality, reputation and the success of SPAC business combination. Also, we 
look at the relationship between time to deal, long-term unit price performance, institutional interest 
and cumulative abnormal returns or institutional interest around SPAC business combination. 
For the first empirical study, we use the dependent variables as in Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005). The first dependent variable is IPO offer size (lnsizei). It is the natural log of the offer size in 
millions of dollars for each firm i. The second dependent variable is top-tier underwriter dummy 
(toptierdummyi). It is one if Carter and Manaster (1990) reputation ranking of lead underwriter is 
greater than or equal to 8 for each firm i. Otherwise, it is zero for each firm i. The third dependent 
variable is underwriting spread as the percentage of the offer price for each firm i (spreadi). The fourth 
dependent variable is other offering expenses as the percentage of the offer size for each firm i 
(oexpensei). The fifth dependent variable is underpricing for each firm i (underpricingi). The 
underpricing is measured as the difference between the closing price at the end of the first day and the 
offer price expressed as the percentage of the offer price for each security. Finally, the institutional 
holdings and the number of institutional investors are used as dependent variables. Institutional 
holdings is the natural log of the percentage of the offer allocated to institutional investors as reported 
in SEC 13-F filings at the end of the first quarter after the IPO for each firm i (instpi). The number of 
institutional investors is the natural log of the number of institutional investors reported in SEC 13-F 
filings at the end of the first quarter after the IPO (instni).  
The explanatory variables are the management quality and reputation variables. We divide the 
management quality and reputation variables into two parts: management experience and other 
management quality and reputation. We include management experience as part of the management 
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quality and reputation because management experience is crucial for SPACs to consummate business 
combination.  
First, management experience is calculated as the average industry experience of management 
team (meanmgtexper.i). Meanmgtexper.i is the ratio of total industry experience years for management 
team members to number of management team members for each firm i. Second, other management 
quality and reputation variables follow those of Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), except for the 
measure of CEO dominance. They measure CEO dominance by calculating the ratio of CEO salary 
and bonus of other team members listed in the executive compensation section of the prospectus. We 
exclude this variable because SPAC management team does not receive any compensation during the 
IPO process. The summary of other management quality and reputation variables is as follows. tsizei is 
the number of officers with the rank of vice president or higher for each firm i. pmbai is the percentage 
of MBA holders within the management team for each firm i. pfteami is the percentage of management 
team members who have the experiences of vice president or higher before joining the firm i. plawacci 
is the percentage of lawyers or accountants within the management team for each firm i. tenurei is the 
average tenure of the management team for each firm i4. Nonprofiti is the number of non-profit boards 
that management team members sit on for each firm i.  
Control variables are as follows. Toptierdummyi is not only used as a dependent variable but 
also a control variable5. bvai is the book value of assets in millions of dollars for each firm i. Also, we 
include bva2i (the squared term of bvai) for each firm i as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). We 
include the lnfagei, which is the natural log of one plus firm age, where firm age is defined as the 
number of years between the year of incorporation and the time of going public6. Finally, odiri is the 
number of outside directors for each firm i. The definition of outside directors is the directors who are 
                                                 
4
 Some firms report the years of working within the firm or industry experience for the management team by year and 
month. For the month part, we divide it by twelve to convert it as a year. 
5
 We also calculate the lead underwriter reputation ranking for each IPO based on the Carter and Manaster reputation 
ranking. The empirical result is similar to one with top-tier dummy. 
6
 In general, the firm age of SPACs is less than one year. We divide it by twelve to convert it as a year. 
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not executives. It is based on Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Other than odiri, Chemmanur and 
Paeglis (2005) use free cash flow as a percentage of the book value of assets to capture other aspects of 
firm quality. We did not use this measure because SPACs do not have any operating income during the 
IPO process. 
For the second empirical study, we use dependent variables as follows. Ttdma or ttdipoma, 
represents time-to-deal in years from the announcement date till consummation date of SPAC business 
combination or from the initial filing date of SPAC IPO till the consummation date of SPAC business 
combination, respectively. Ltpmau represents unit return performance from the announcement date till 
consummation date of SPAC business combination. Sindicator is equal to one if SPAC consummated 
business combination, is equal to two if SPAC liquidated, and is equal to three if SPAC business 
combination is in progress. Explanatory and control variables are the same as ones in the first 
empirical study, except for underpricing. We include underpricing as the measure of firm quality 
signaling following previous literature (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 
1989). 
ACAR(-1,1), ACAR(-2,2), ACAR(-5,5) represents unit CAR around the announcement of SPAC 
business combination with the event window (-1,1), (-2,2) and (-5,5), respectively. CCAR(-1,1), 
CCAR(-2,2), CCAR(-5,5) represents unit CAR around the consummation of SPAC business 
combination with the event window (-1,1), (-2,2) and (-5,5), respectively. Instnc or instpc represents 
the number of institutional investors at the end of the first quarter after SPAC business combination 
consummation or the ratio of institutional ownership to IPO unit offering amount at the end of the first 
quarter after SPAC business combination consummation, respectively. Explanatory variables are ttdipo, 
ltpmau, and ltpipou. Ttdipo, ltpmau or ltpipou represents time-to-deal in years from the initial filing 
date till the final prospectus filing date of SPAC IPO, unit return performance from the announcement 
till the consummation date of SPAC business combination or from the IPO consummation date till the 
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announcement date of SPAC business combination, respectively. Control variables are the same as 
ones in the first empirical study. 
4.3 Summary Statistics : Management Quality, Reputation and IPO Characteristics 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the sample. The sample consists of 158 SPAC IPOs 
with matched common stock IPOs. The SPAC IPO is the unit issue which is the combination of 
common stocks and warrants. For SPAC IPOs, 70 firms are traded in the over the counter (OTC) 
market, one firm is traded in Nasdaq, and 81 firms are traded in American Stock Exchange. For 
matched common stock IPOs, seven firms are traded in American Stock Exchange, 122 firms are 
traded in Nasdaq, and 29 firms are traded in New York Stock Exchange. 'N’ is the number of 
observations. 
Panel A or panel B shows the summary statistics for SPAC IPO or matched common stock IPO, 
respectively. The average meanmgtexper. for SPAC IPO is 19.13 (median, 18.68). It is higher than that 
of matched common stock IPO (mean, 16.60; median, 16.22). More experienced people are in the 
management team for SPACs. The average tsize for SPAC IPO is 6.09 (median, 6).  It is almost half of 
that for matched common stock IPO (mean, 12.11, median, 12). The average pfteam for SPAC IPO is 
0.71 (median, 0.75). It is almost one and a half times larger than that for matched common stock IPO 
(mean, 0.49; median, 0.50). So, SPACs have smaller in team size but more people with experience in 
vice president or higher within the management team. The average pmba for SPAC IPO is 0.34 
(median, 0.31). The average plawacc for SPAC IPO is 0.21 (median, 0.20). In general, more MBAs 
than lawyers or accountants are within the SPAC management team. However, they are not dominant 
because the ratio is less than fifty percent. The results are consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005), but the mean or median value is higher than their sample. The average pmba or plawacct for 
matched common stock IPO is 0.29 (median, 0.29) or 0.18 (median, 0.16) It seems that SPAC IPO 
involves more professionals than matched common stock IPO. The average tenure for SPAC IPO is 
0.57 (median, 0.49). On average, SPAC management team has less than one year of tenure. It is 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics: Management Quality, Reputation and IPO Characteristics 
The summary statistics of variables are presented. Meanmgtexper. is the mean industry experience of management team, tsize is the 
management team size, pmba is the the percentage of MBAs, pfteam is the percentage of management team members with the prior 
experience of vice presidents or higher, plawacc is the percentage of lawyers or accountants, tenure is the mean tenure of management 
team, tenhet is the coefficient of variation of the team member’s tenures, nonprofit is the number of management team members who sit 
on non-profit boards, odir is the number of outside directors as defined in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Lnbva, bva and bva2 
represents the natural log of book value of total assets, book value of total assets and the squared term of bva, respectively. Lnfage is the 
natural log of firm age defined as the period from firm’s founding date till firm’s IPO date.  lnsize is the natural log of IPO offer size, 
toptierdummy is equal to one if IPO involves top-tier underwriters with Carter and Manaster’s reputation ranking of eight or higher; 
otherwise, it is zero. Spread and oexpense represents underwriting spread and other offering expense, respectively. Underpricing is the 
IPO underpricing. Instp and instn is the natural log of the percentage of the offer allocated to institutional investors and the number of 
institutional investors as reported in SEC 13-F filings at the end of the first quarter after the IPO, respectively. Panel A is SPAC IPO (158 
IPOs, 152 SPACs). Panel B is matched common stock IPO (158 IPOs). N represents the number of observations. Sample period is from 
August 2003 till February 2008. 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum  Standard Deviation 
Panel A: SPAC IPO 
meanmgtexper. 
tsize 
pmba 
pfteam 
plawacc 
tenure 
tenhet 
nonprofit 
odir 
lnbva 
bva 
bva2 
lnfage 
lnsize 
toptierdummy 
spread 
oexpense 
underpricing 
instp 
instn 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
19.13 
6.09 
0.34 
0.71 
0.21 
0.57 
0.11 
1.85 
3.08 
5.37 
0.36 
0.35 
-0.57 
18.06 
0.29 
6.85 
7.22 
0.02 
0.19 
6.87 
18.68 
6 
0.31 
0.75 
0.20 
0.49 
0 
1 
3 
5.40 
0.25 
0.06 
-0.61 
17.91 
0 
7 
7.44 
0.004 
0.07 
2 
6.86 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0.19 
0 
0 
0 
4.29 
0.02 
0 
-1.39 
14.09 
0 
3 
0.33 
-0.05 
0 
0 
33 
13 
1 
1 
0.75 
2.33 
0.91 
15 
10 
6.51 
3.26 
10.60 
1.61 
20.62 
1 
10 
12.91 
0.25 
1 
48 
5.09 
1.90 
0.23 
0.22 
0.17 
0.30 
0.18 
2.74 
1.63 
0.40 
0.47 
1.33 
0.50 
1.15 
0.46 
1.56 
2.28 
0.04 
0.25 
10.28 
Panel B: Matched Common Stock IPO 
meanmgtexper. 
tsize 
pmba 
pfteam 
plawacc 
tenure 
tenhet 
nonprofit 
odir 
lnbva 
bva 
bva2 
lnfage 
lnsize 
toptierdummy 
spread 
oexpense 
underpricing 
instp 
instn 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
158 
16.60 
12.11 
0.29 
0.49 
0.18 
3.72 
0.82 
1.34 
5.87 
8 
340.61 
513700.13 
2.04 
18.11 
0.67 
6.94 
3.39 
0.12 
1.03 
29.42 
16.22 
12 
0.29 
0.50 
0.16 
3.30 
0.74 
0 
6 
7.90 
79.95 
6393.59 
2.04 
18.13 
1 
7 
2.83 
0.06 
0.97 
25 
5 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0.13 
0.06 
0 
0 
5.07 
0.12 
0.01 
-1.79 
15.76 
0 
5 
0.20 
-0.31 
0 
0 
33.56 
26 
0.71 
1 
0.88 
18.88 
2.05 
10 
18 
9.62 
4163.12 
17331586.04 
3.95 
20.43 
1 
10 
14.38 
0.73 
5.22 
117 
4.80 
3.40 
0.16 
0.17 
0.14 
2.41 
0.36 
1.98 
2.08 
0.76 
632.63 
2086518.58 
0.92 
0.84 
0.47 
0.49 
2.15 
0.19 
0.79 
23.02 
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understandable because SPAC is the newly-formed blank check company that seeks a business 
combination in the future. The document processing time is short for SPAC IPO. Because the 
management team is formed when the blank check company is founded, the average tenure of the 
management team is supposed to be short. However, that of the management team for matched 
common stock IPO is 3.72 (median, 3.30). The average tenhet is 0.11 (median, 0) for SPAC IPO. 
Comparing with matched common stock IPO (mean, 0.82; median, 0.74), it is relatively low. Tenhet is 
the tenure heterogeneity measured by the coefficient of variation of the management team member’s 
tenure. So, the tenure of management team members is more heterogeneous for matched common 
stock IPO than that for SPAC IPO. The average nonprofit is 1.85 (median, 1) for SPAC IPO. It is 
higher than that for matched common stock IPO (mean, 1.34; median, 0). It seems that SPAC 
management team sits on more non-profit boards than the management team of matched common 
stock does. 
For control variables, the average odir for SPAC IPO (mean, 3.08; median, 3) is almost half of 
that for matched common stock IPO (mean, 5.87; median, 6). More outside directors are involved in 
the management team of matched common stock. The average bva is 0.36 for SPAC IPO (median, 
0.25), while it is 340.61 for matched common stock IPO (median, 79.95). As SPACs do not have any 
business operation at the time of IPO, their book value of asset is cash from management team. That is 
why bva for SPAC is so small comparing with matched common stock. The average lnfage is -0.57 for 
SPAC IPO (median, -0.61), while it is 2.04 for matched common stock IPO (median, 2.04). Lnfage is 
the natural log of firm age in years. As the age of most SPACs in the sample is less than one year, the 
value of lnfage is negative.  
For dependent variables, the average lnsize is 18.06 (median, 17.91) for SPAC IPO. Comparing 
with matched common stock IPO (mean, 18.11; median, 18.13), it is very close even though it is not 
the same. As we already mentioned from the matched sample construction process, we cannot match 
two samples exactly by the size due to the limit of available IPO firms. So, there is a small difference 
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between them. Top-tier underwriter dummy (toptierdummy) is much higher for matched common 
stock IPO than for SPAC IPO. The average toptierdummy for SPAC IPO is 0.29 (median, 0). On the 
other hand, that for matched common stock IPO is 0.67 (median, 1). Greater than sixty five percent of 
matched common stock IPO is supported by top-tier underwriters within our sample. The result is also 
consistent with previous literature (Schultz, 1993; Jain, 1994). The average spread for SPAC IPO is 
6.85 (median, 7), while that for matched common stock IPO is 6.94 (median, 7). The seven percent 
solution of underwriting spread holds both for SPAC IPO and for matched common stock IPO (Chen 
and Ritter, 2000). The average oexpense for SPAC IPO is 7.22 (median, 7.44). Comparing with 
matched common stock IPO (mean, 3.39; median, 2.83), other offering expense as the percentage of 
offer size is way higher. The average underpricing for SPAC IPO is 0.02 (median, 0.004). It is smaller 
than that of matched common stock IPO (mean, 0.12; median 0.06). The average instp is 0.19 for 
SPAC IPO (median, 0.07), while it is 1.03 for matched common stock IPO (median, 0.97). The 
average instn is 6.87 (median, 2), while it is 29.42 (median, 25). Comparing with matched common 
stock IPO, institutional investors are not attracted to SPAC IPO. 
Overall, management experience, other management quality and reputation or offering 
characteristics are different between SPAC IPO and matched common stock IPO. However, offering 
size and underwriting spreads are similar. The result implies that the effects of explanatory variables 
on varying dependent variables will be different among SPAC IPO and matched common stock IPO. 
4.4 Correlation : Management Quality, Reputation and IPO Characteristics 
Table 3 shows the correlation between independent variables. Panel A shows the correlation for 
SPAC IPO. Panel B shows the correlation for matched common stock IPO. Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005) control for the correlation between firm size proxies (lnbva, bva, and bva2) and other 
management quality and reputation variables either by adjusting proxies for firm size and using these 
adjusted proxies in various regressions or by using proxies of firm size as control variables in these 
regressions. As we can see from panel A and B of Table 3, no management quality and reputation  
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Table 3 Pearson Correlation: SPAC IPO vs. Matched Common Stock IPO 
The Pearson correlation results for SPAC and matched common stock IPO are provided. The definitions of variables are the same as the ones in Table 2.  
  
meanmgt
exper. tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet 
non-
profit lnbva bva bva2 lnfage odir 
Panel A: Correlations between independent variables for SPAC IPO 
meanmgtexper. 1             
tsize 0.12 1            
pmba -0.02 -0.16 1           
pfteam 0.11 -0.03 -0.10 1          
plawacc -0.16 0.04 -0.10 -0.11 1         
tenure 0.21 0.00 -0.15 0.05 -0.13 1        
tenhet 0.13 0.42 -0.13 0.05 0.04 -0.02 1       
nonprofit 0.13 0.33 -0.07 0.20 -0.06 -0.18 0.30 1      
lnbva 0.22 0.27 -0.24 -0.02 -0.04 0.32 0.42 0.13 1     
bva 0.11 0.16 -0.16 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.38 0.13 0.77 1    
bva2 0.05 0.06 -0.09 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.10 0.54 0.94 1   
lnfage 0.27 0.12 -0.15 0.05 -0.12 0.84 0.18 -0.14 0.38 0.27 0.12 1  
odir 0.07 0.66 -0.16 0.14 0.11 -0.10 0.23 0.31 0.24 0.13 0.06 -0.08 1 
 
meanmgt
exper. tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet 
non-
profit lnbva bva bva2 lnfage odir 
Panel B: Correlations between independent variables for matched common stock IPO 
meanmgtexper. 1             
tsize -0.05 1            
pmba -0.08 -0.08 1           
pfteam 0.12 -0.25 0.09 1          
plawacc 0.25 -0.16 -0.01 -0.05 1         
tenure 0.21 0.20 -0.07 -0.20 0.01 1        
tenhet 0.12 -0.13 0.01 0.15 0.07 -0.04 1       
nonprofit 0.26 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.16 -0.01 1      
lnbva 0.40 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.22 1     
bva 0.27 0.33 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.04 0.32 0.68 1    
bva2 0.16 0.34 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.27 0.44 0.91 1   
lnfage 0.14 0.08 0.04 -0.15 0.03 0.50 0.37 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.03 1  
odir 0.17 0.72 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 0.18 -0.11 0.06 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.07 1 
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variables are highly correlated with firm size proxies. So, we did not report the regression results using 
adjusted proxies.7 Also, tenure has a high correlation with lnfage or tsize has a high correlation with 
odir (correlation coefficients of 0.84 and 0.66 for SPAC IPO; correlation coefficients of 0.50 and 0.72 
for matched common stock IPO). We adjust this variable for lnfage and odir and use the adjusted 
tenure or tsize in various regressions. However, the regression results do not change when we run 
regressions without adjustment. So, we did not report the results with adjusted variables. 
Table 4 shows the relationship between firm size and proxies for management quality and 
reputation as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Panel A shows the relationship for SPAC IPO. Panel 
B shows the relationship for matched common stock IPO. As we can see from panel A and Panel B of 
Table 4, there is no monotonic relationship between firm size and management quality and reputation 
variables except for meanmgtexper. in panel B. As we can see from panel B, the meanmgtexper. of 
matched common stock IPO increases as firm size increases. However, as we can see from panel B of 
Table 3, the correlation between meanmgtexper. and lnbva, bva or bva2 is not high (less than 40 
percent). So, we perform the regression analyses without any adjustment as in Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005).8 
4.5 Factor Analysis: Management Quality, Reputation and IPO Characteristics 
Common factor analysis is executed based on Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). They argue that 
the analysis captures the common variation among management quality and reputation variables which 
is not captured by individual variable. Also, we perform the analysis based on management quality and 
reputation variables.9  
                                                 
7
 The regression results are qualitatively similar to ones without adjustment. 
8
 For each regression analysis in this study, we calculate the Variance Influence Factor (VIF) to detect multicollinearity 
problem due to high correlation among some of independent variables. VIF is less than 2 for each regression. Considering 
the standard VIF value is 4 for multicolliearity detection point, we can run regressions without considering multicollinearity 
problem. 
9
 Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) perform the analysis based on firm-size-adjusted management quality and reputation 
variables because their variables increase with firm size. However, our sample does not show any distinctive increasing 
pattern as firm size increases as we show in Table 4. So, we perform our analysis without firm-size adjustment. We also 
perform the analysis, not reported, with firm-size adjustment, and both results are qualitatively the same.  
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Table 4 Average Management Experience, Quality and Reputation by Firm Size 
The average management experience, quality and reputation by firm size for SPAC and matched common stock IPO are provided. The 
definitions of variables are the same as the ones in Table 2. Qunitile 1 to quintile 5 represents the firm size quintiles. Firm size is defined 
as the book value of total assets. 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Panel A: SPAC IPO 
meanmgtexper. 16.44 19.27 20.22 19.93 19.70 
tsize 5.13 5.66 6.50 6.25 6.90 
pmba 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.36 0.23 
pfteam 0.76 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.73 
plawacc 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.20 
tenure 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.60 0.80 
tenhet 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.26 
nonprofit 0.94 1.81 2.78 1.63 2.06 
Panel B: Matched Common Stock IPO 
meanmgtexper. 14.38 15.00 16.05 18.53 19.04 
tsize 10.65 11.66 13.06 11.78 13.39 
pmba 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.28 
pfteam 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.55 0.50 
plawacc 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.21 
tenure 2.94 3.57 4.03 4.17 3.87 
tenhet 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.83 0.84 
nonprofit 1.35 0.44 1.22 1.53 2.19 
 
Thus, the team resources factor (TRF) score is obtained using common factor analysis on tsize, 
pmba, plawacc, and pfteam variables. Similarly, the team structure factor (TSF) score is obtained using 
common factor analysis on tenure and tenhet. We exclude CEO compensation variable (fceo) which is 
included in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) to calculate TSF score because it is not available for 
SPACs.10  
Table 5 presents the results of the common factor analysis. Panel A presents starting 
communalities, calculated as the squared multiple correlations obtained from regressing each of the 
management quality measures on the other measures within the same dimension, while panel B reports 
the eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrices. The only difference with Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005) is that we exclude fceo variable.  
 
                                                 
10
 SPAC CEOs do not receive any compensation until they consummate business combination. It is prescribed in SEC 
filings. 
 22 
Table 5 Common Factor Analysis with Six Measures of Management Quality 
Common factor analysis statistics are presented. TRF is the management team resources factor score from tsize, plawacc, pfteam and pmba. TSF is the management team structure factor 
score from tenure and tenhet. The definition of other variables are the same as ones in Table 2. 
Panel A: estimated communalities of six management quality measures 
SPAC IPO Matched Common Stock IPO 
 tsize plawacc pfteam pmba   tsize plawacc pfteam pmba 
TRF 0.0851 0.0478 0.000001 0.1186  TRF 0.1993 0.0196 0.1469 0.0318 
           
 tenure tenhet     tenure tenhet   
TSF 0.0079 0.0079    TSF 0.0205 0.0205   
           
Panel B: eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix of six management quality measures 
SPAC IPO Matched Common Stock IPO 
 1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
TRF 0.25151 -0.21335 -0.04562 0.14018  TRF 0.39769 -0.24803 -0.03787 0.11306 
           
TSF 0.01580 -0.01532    TSF 0.04096 -0.03785   
           
Panel C: correlations between the common factors and six management quality measures 
SPAC IPO Matched Common Stock IPO 
 tsize plawacc pfteam pmba   tsize plawacc pfteam pmba 
TRF 0.6407 0.4802 0.0020 -0.7565  TRF -0.8122 0.2546 0.6973 0.3246 
           
 tenure tenhet     tenure tenhet   
TSF 0.7126 -0.7126    TSF 0.7209 -0.7209   
           
Panel D: descriptive statistics of the common factors extracted from six management quality measures 
SPAC IPO Matched Common Stock IPO 
 TRF TSF    TRF TSF    
Maximum 1.089 0.569    1.323 0.834    
3rd quartile 0.275 0.059    0.370 0.107    
Median 0.029 0.01    0.007 0.012    
1st quartile -0.297 -0.039    -0.289 -0.104    
Minimum -1.293 -0.452    -1.755 -0.617    
Mean 0 0     0 0       
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Similar to Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), the summed communalities are less than or equal to 
the eigenvalues for the first factor in the factor analysis for each dimension of management quality and 
reputation, suggesting that one factor in each of the dimensions parsimoniously explains the 
intercorrelations among the individual measures. For example, the sum of estimated communalities of 
the team resources factor (TRF) score is 0.251501, which is smaller than the eigenvalue for the first 
factor (0.25151) for SPAC IPO. That of team structure factor (TSF) score is 0.0158, which is equal to 
the eigenvalue for the first factor (0.0158) for SPAC IPO.  
Correlations between the common factor scores and their respective original measures of 
management quality are reported in Panel C, while Panel D reports summary statistics of TRF and TSF 
scores for SPAC IPO and matched common stock IPO. As we can see from Panel C, the correlation 
between TRF and tsize or pfteam is high for matched common stock IPO. That between TRF and 
plawacc or pmba is relatively low for matched common stock IPO. The correlation between TSF and 
tenure or tenhet is high. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). For SPAC IPO, 
the correlation between TRF and tsize or pmba is high while that between TRF and plawacc or pfteam 
is relatively low. So, team size and the percentage of MBA holders are major components of TRF for 
SPAC IPO, while team size and the percentage of team members with prior vice president or higher 
are major components of TRF for matched common stock IPO. The correlation between TSF and 
tenure or tenhet is high.  
In panel D, the average TRF or TSF is the same between SPAC IPO and matched common 
stock IPO. The median TRF is higher for SPAC IPO than that for matched common stock IPO. 
However, the median TSF is similar between SPAC IPO and matched common stock IPO. The median 
values are close to zero both for SPAC IPO and for matched common stock IPO. The result is 
consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
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Table 6 reports the results of our univariate tests of the relationship between management 
quality and reputation and IPO characteristics for SPAC IPO (Panel A and Panel B) and matched 
common stock IPO (Panel C and Panel D). We split the sample by management quality factor score 
(TRF and TSF) quintiles and by firm size quintiles. Panel A and C show the test results of top-tier 
underwriter dummy, IPO offer size in millions, underwriting spread as a percentage of offer price and 
other offering expenses as a percentage of offer size. Panel B and D show the test results of IPO 
underpricing, institutional holdings and the number of institutional investors.  
For SPAC IPO, consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), we find that high management 
quality firms (i.e., firms in the top TRF score quintile) are associated with top-tier underwriters, incur 
lower underwriting spread, and attract greater institutional interest. For example, the difference 
between top-tier underwriter dummy of firms in the top and the bottom TRF score quintiles is 0.128 
within one percent significance level. The difference is statistically significant for all IPO 
characteristics except for underpricing and other offering expenses. They do not vary much with TRF 
score for SPAC IPO. 
The variation of SPAC IPO characteristics across TSF score is consistent with the result of 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), except for underpricing and the number of institutional investors. 
Underpricing is higher for high TSF score but the difference between underpricing of firms in the top 
and the bottom TSF score quintiles is not statistically significant. Also, the difference between top and 
bottom TSF quintiles is statistically significant for institutional holdings after IPO, which is not the 
case for Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
However, for matched common stock IPO, we find that high team resource factor firms (i.e., 
firms in the top TRF score quintile) are less likely to be associated with top-tier underwriters, incur 
higher underwriting spread, and lower institutional holdings. Other offering expenses, underpricing 
and the number of institutional investors are not statistically different between top and bottom TRF 
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Table 6 IPO Characteristics split into firm size, management quality and reputation factor quintiles: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
Average IPO characteristics split into firm size, management quality and reputation factor (TRF, TSF) quintiles for SPAC and matched common stock IPOs are provided. Panel A & B 
show IPO characteristics for SPAC IPO. Panel C & D are IPO characteristics for matched common stock IPO. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2 and Table 5. T-
test results for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively.   
Panel A: Underwriter reputation, IPO offer size, underwriting spread, offering expense and underpricing split into firm size and management quality quintiles (SPAC IPO) 
Management Quality Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                             TRF                                                                                                                              TSF 
toptierdummy 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.107 0.122 0.203 0.186 0.254 0.174  0.290 0.208 0.130 0.136 0.111 0.152  
2 0.212 0.197 0.263 0.241 0.310 0.228  0.367 0.242 0.204 0.222 0.179 0.259  
3 0.293 0.310 0.414 0.386 0.382 0.369  0.471 0.367 0.306 0.333 0.321 0.358  
4 0.263 0.263 0.309 0.328 0.407 0.314  0.439 0.295 0.279 0.302 0.259 0.315  
5 0.288 0.311 0.386 0.370 0.471 0.364  0.481 0.345 0.317 0.322 0.360 0.381  
               
Average 0.233 0.223 0.315 0.285 0.379  -0.128 0.440 0.273 0.277 0.248 0.230  0.174 
       (-3.35)***       (4.50)*** 
lnsize 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 67.813 72.114 78.074 81.987 119.053 83.808  134.936 102.37 67.531 56.757 55.780 90.398  
2 107.854 99.490 101.492 111.335 142.343 106.894  168.037 113.060 97.227 89.584 89.213 118.283  
3 133.099 132.150 140.029 151.053 158.812 145.748  192.157 146.051 129.962 124.769 127.111 143.500  
4 110.668 105.475 118.689 116.106 158.419 121.871  179.911 116.525 108.747 102.737 101.616 123.253  
5 127.702 135.786 149.477 156.694 195.074 152.010  191.159 165.780 133.110 131.484 140.975 166.067  
               
Average 109.427 104.458 117.552 115.120 157.840  -43.77 173.240 102.366 100.867 93.462 123.234  73.77 
       (-3.33)***       (5.70)*** 
spread 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 7.540 7.375 7.242 7.490 7.241 7.286  7.371 7.276 7.540 7.394 7.295 7.286  
2 7.131 7.205 6.732 7.052 6.747 6.972  6.877 7.069 7.273 7.004 6.653 7.051  
3 6.851 6.854 6.539 6.715 6.465 6.643  6.625 6.800 7.012 6.574 6.376 6.647  
4 6.933 7.000 6.588 6.805 6.543 6.717  6.640 6.856 7.089 6.700 6.537 6.813  
5 6.646 6.608 6.260 6.408 6.266 6.507  6.287 6.643 6.767 6.288 6.161 6.364  
               
Average 6.890 6.992 6.775 6.857 6.629  0.348 6.596 6.960 7.125 6.789 6.592  0.217 
       (2.67)***       (1.58) 
oexpense 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 8.271 8.228 8.031 7.967 8.038 8.099  7.845 8.103 8.328 8.180 8.080 8.216  
2 7.402 7.616 7.134 7.041 7.037 7.192  6.873 7.560 7.507 7.198 7.099 7.193  
3 7.097 7.310 6.827 6.775 6.794 6.873  6.548 7.242 7.311 6.901 6.720 6.920  
4 6.953 7.286 6.853 6.764 6.808 6.845  6.484 7.346 7.152 6.850 6.768 6.801  
5 6.908 7.175 6.599 6.845 6.645 6.909  6.520 7.063 7.146 6.699 6.716 6.890  
               
Average 7.090 7.702 7.211 6.860 7.071  0.237 6.635 7.583 7.575 7.050 6.742  -0.157 
       (1.28)       (-0.88) 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Panel B: Underpricing, holdings of institutional shareholders and number of institutional shareholders split into firm size and management quality quintiles (SPAC IPO) 
Management Quality Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                       TRF                                                                                                                                        TSF 
underpricing 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.027 0.029 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.025  0.025 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.028 0.025  
2 0.013 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.016  0.018 0.014 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.017  
3 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.016  0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.016  
4 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.019 0.008  
5 0.014 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014  0.012 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.023 0.016  
               
Average 0.015 0.023 0.013 0.014 0.017  0.0001 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.024  -0.006 
       (0.04)       (-1.44) 
instp 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.148 0.126 0.159 0.134 0.216 0.157   0.192 0.170 0.133 0.151 0.139 0.157   
2 0.205 0.174 0.185 0.177 0.248 0.198   0.232 0.208 0.191 0.180 0.172 0.197   
3 0.193 0.173 0.211 0.174 0.219 0.194   0.237 0.202 0.167 0.199 0.169 0.195   
4 0.203 0.168 0.192 0.172 0.254 0.198   0.222 0.197 0.189 0.206 0.177 0.198   
5 0.224 0.193 0.225 0.202 0.274 0.224   0.264 0.219 0.203 0.205 0.227 0.224   
               
Average 0.195  0.167  0.194  0.172  0.242   -0.047 0.229  0.199  0.177  0.188  0.177   0.056 
       (-2.10)**       (2.55)** 
instn 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 3.143 3.224 4.627 3.983 7.780 4.551   6.968 5.038 4.148 3.966 2.667 4.557   
2 6.327 5.820 6.526 6.345 9.741 6.952   9.517 6.677 6.593 6.167 5.625 6.916   
3 5.776 6.207 8.052 7.070 9.018 7.225   9.961 7.033 6.355 7.404 5.625 7.276   
4 5.667 5.526 6.545 6.172 9.983 6.779   9.088 6.262 6.607 6.849 5.167 6.795   
5 7.695 7.230 9.070 8.537 11.686 8.844   10.923 8.828 8.000 7.949 8.320 8.804   
               
Average 5.722  5.601  6.964  6.421  9.642   -3.858 9.291  6.768  6.341  6.467  5.481   4.089 
       (-4.31)***       (4.84)*** 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Panel C: Underwriter reputation, IPO offer size, underwriting spread and  offering expense split into firm size and management quality quintiles (Matched Common Stock IPO) 
Management Quality Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                       TRF                                                                                                                                   TSF 
toptierdummy 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.569 0.517 0.536 0.527 0.509 0.532  0.455 0.527 0.579 0.556 0.541 0.541  
2 0.732 0.661 0.655 0.596 0.610 0.661  0.552 0.678 0.698 0.649 0.678 0.644  
3 0.764 0.702 0.679 0.655 0.667 0.691  0.614 0.724 0.741 0.672 0.709 0.684  
4 0.780 0.678 0.702 0.655 0.642 0.669  0.579 0.709 0.742 0.712 0.717 0.692  
5 0.889 0.768 0.814 0.741 0.727 0.800  0.673 0.814 0.839 0.793 0.815 0.775  
               
Average 0.739 0.656 0.677 0.608 0.636  0.113 0.605 0.682 0.755 0.647 0.656  -0.113 
       
(2.89)**
* 
      (-2.80)*** 
lnsize 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 72.905 90.890 79.715 85.423 87.146 81.297  94.523 97.987 75.158 70.615 78.199 84.571  
2 75.044 88.899 76.667 78.797 89.047 76.836  88.358 98.817 76.362 67.267 76.886 77.329  
3 84.287 104.264 89.006 90.604 102.020 87.966  98.213 114.952 86.885 80.930 89.833 91.644  
4 112.351 124.324 108.626 109.156 118.898 114.671  118.917 127.54 110.979 102.838 114.093 114.874  
5 147.748 141.286 143.109 146.971 159.680 144.048  147.109 157.087 139.426 139.597 155.128 151.119  
               
Average 98.467 132.805 99.425 90.995 103.022  -12.69 109.424 112.765 87.346 80.240 119.685  7.52 
       (-1.67)*       (0.40) 
spread 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 7.033 7.079 7.017 7.061 7.095 7.064  7.100 7.089 7.053 7.065 6.986 7.038  
2 6.906 6.953 6.945 6.968 7.006 6.940  7.041 6.953 6.941 6.989 6.858 6.990  
3 6.904 6.931 6.932 7.008 7.008 6.963  7.061 6.922 6.970 6.957 6.878 6.965  
4 6.845 6.882 6.842 6.940 6.933 6.873  6.982 6.884 6.871 6.872 6.828 6.850  
5 6.841 6.882 6.813 6.877 6.882 6.868  6.960 6.855 6.858 6.850 6.771 6.813  
               
Average 6.874 6.981 6.934 6.988 6.980  -0.079 7.051 6.972 6.906 6.973 6.866  0.161 
       (-2.00)**       (3.70)*** 
oexpense 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 3.789 3.727 4.050 3.854 3.830 3.727  3.882 3.697 4.244 3.852 3.583 3.971  
2 3.620 3.873 4.157 3.958 3.727 4.058  3.883 3.840 4.088 3.947 3.607 3.973  
3 3.326 3.252 3.617 3.521 3.427 3.473  3.701 3.222 3.755 3.334 3.123 3.597  
4 2.647 2.795 3.161 3.024 3.003 2.959  3.169 2.879 3.167 2.767 2.589 2.975  
5 2.755 2.745 3.185 2.872 2.885 2.795  3.025 2.824 3.281 2.867 2.456 2.640  
               
Average 2.909 3.236 3.645 3.501 3.105  -0.155 3.584 3.261 3.814 3.641 2.523  0.439 
       (-0.85)       (2.33)** 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Panel D: Underpricing, holdings of institutional shareholders and number of institutional shareholders split into firm size and management quality quintiles (Matched Common Stock IPO) 
Management Quality Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                                  TRF                                                                                                                                 TSF 
underpricing 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.111 0.098 0.105 0.112 0.125 0.112  0.089 0.121 0.088 0.123 0.128 0.125  
2 0.139 0.093 0.109 0.126 0.117 0.125  0.101 0.103 0.123 0.126 0.131 0.117  
3 0.137 0.115 0.112 0.147 0.133 0.132  0.107 0.131 0.135 0.137 0.135 0.129  
4 0.132 0.090 0.112 0.132 0.105 0.122  0.099 0.113 0.111 0.114 0.136 0.113  
5 0.132 0.121 0.124 0.150 0.109 0.121  0.099 0.119 0.137 0.138 0.144 0.121  
               
Average 0.136 0.110 0.111 0.135 0.122  0.012 0.102 0.120 0.123 0.126 0.136  -0.036 
       (0.45)       (-2.27)** 
instp 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.984 0.999 0.927 0.915 0.940 0.953   0.951 0.957 0.966 1.007 0.895 0.955   
2 1.047 1.020 0.947 0.868 0.933 0.963   0.921 0.961 1.022 1.001 0.912 0.963   
3 1.086 1.133 1.042 0.946 0.974 1.036   0.933 1.105 1.053 1.107 0.972 1.034   
4 1.185 1.097 1.070 1.035 1.053 1.088   1.063 1.076 1.118 1.081 1.105 1.089   
5 1.182 1.149 1.056 1.035 1.021 1.089   1.020 1.116 1.136 1.102 1.058 1.086   
               
Average 1.097  1.080  1.008  0.960  0.984   0.113 0.978  1.043  1.059  1.060  0.988   -0.007 
       (1.79)*       (-0.11) 
instn 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 25.103 24.259 21.500 26.855 26.909 24.925   27.691 26.236 22.789 23.963 24.016 24.939   
2 29.768 25.429 22.948 27.105 28.763 26.803   28.431 27.339 25.623 26.649 25.847 26.778   
3 28.327 29.088 26.571 29.845 29.817 28.730   28.684 31.207 28.293 27.759 27.782 28.745   
4 33.949 30.186 28.263 31.397 32.000 31.159   32.053 31.164 30.306 30.746 31.660 31.186   
5 38.370 33.821 31.085 37.414 37.055 35.549   35.309 35.322 35.196 34.879 36.815 35.504   
               
Average 31.103  28.557  26.073  30.523  30.909   0.199 30.434  30.254  28.441  28.799  29.224   1.390 
       (0.11)       (0.68) 
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score quintiles. The difference between top-tier underwriter dummy of firms in the top and the bottom 
TRF score quintiles is 0.113 within one percent significance level. The difference between 
underwriting spread as a percentage of the offer price in the top and the bottom TRF score quintiles is 
0.079 within five percent significance level. Finally, the difference between institutional holdings in 
the top and the bottom TRF score quintiles is 0.113 within five percent significance level. The results 
are not consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).  
For TSF score results, we find that high team structure factor firms (i.e., firms in the top TSF 
score quintile) are associated with top-tier underwriters, incur lower expenses of going public (both in 
terms of underwriting spread and other expenses of going public) and higher underpricing. The 
Institutional holdings and the number of institutional investors are not statistically different between 
top and bottom TSF score quintiles. 
Table 7 reports the results of our univariate tests of the relationship between management 
experience and reputation and IPO characteristics for SPAC IPO and matched common stock IPO. As 
management experience is crucial for the success of SPAC IPO, we performed the same analysis as in 
Table 6 using management experience. We split the sample by management experience and by firm 
size quintiles. Panel A shows the test results of top-tier underwriter dummy, IPO offer size in millions, 
underwriting spread as a percentage of offer price and other offering expenses as a percentage of offer 
size. Panel B shows the test results of IPO underpricing, institutional holdings and the number of 
institutional investors. 
For SPAC IPO, consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), we find that high management 
experience firms are associated with top-tier underwriters, incur lower offering expenses (both 
underwriting spread and other offering expenses), and greater underpricing. For example, the 
difference between top-tier underwriter dummy of firms in the top and the bottom TRF score quintiles 
is 0.009 within one percent significance level. The difference is statistically significant for all IPO 
characteristics except for the institutional holdings and the number of institutional investors. The  
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Table 7 IPO characteristics split into firm size and management experience quintiles: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
Average IPO characteristics split into firm size, management experience (meanmgtexper.) quintiles for SPAC and matched common stock IPOs are provided. Panel A shows IPO 
characteristics for SPAC IPO. Panel B shows IPO characteristics for matched common stock IPO. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2 and Table 5. T-test results 
for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively.   
Panel A: Underwriter reputation, IPO offer size, underwriting spread and offering expense split into firm size and management experience quintiles 
Management Experience Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                                  SPAC                                                                                                                    Matched Common Stock 
toptierdummy 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.106 0.200 0.186 0.220 0.158 0.174  0.549 0.544 0.500 0.536 0.533 0.532  
2 0.175 0.259 0.263 0.281 0.246 0.245  0.684 0.614 0.633 0.656 0.661 0.650  
3 0.288 0.397 0.368 0.404 0.327 0.357  0.714 0.683 0.698 0.667 0.702 0.693  
4 0.246 0.321 0.327 0.368 0.316 0.316  0.702 0.689 0.661 0.690 0.725 0.693  
5 0.259 0.407 0.362 0.417 0.365 0.362  0.836 0.778 0.764 0.784 0.769 0.786  
               
Average 0.215 0.317 0.301 0.338 0.282  -0.065 0.697 0.662 0.651 0.667 0.678  0.028 
       (-1.86)*       (1.21) 
lnsize 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 58.508 77.776 77.689 126.863 75.681 83.303  73.592 86.474 66.465 101.917 86.849 83.059  
2 87.369 107.231 110.454 147.311 110.239 112.521  76.825 83.815 65.713 94.999 83.891 81.049  
3 118.166 137.456 129.010 191.676 138.680 142.998  87.399 91.856 80.564 110.187 99.169 93.835  
4 94.441 116.327 122.116 160.782 118.820 122.497  108.201 111.005 100.822 133.242 121.037 114.861  
5 122.346 156.287 151.018 175.763 152.067 151.496  150.645 137.789 140.818 153.693 157.444 148.078  
               
Average 96.166 119.015 118.057 160.479 119.097  -22.850 99.332 102.188 90.876 118.808 109.678  -7.239 
       (-2.29)**       (-1.49) 
spread 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 7.514 7.380 7.381 7.350 7.279 7.381  7.062 7.094 7.060 7.063 7.009 7.058  
2 7.356 6.910 7.045 6.908 6.649 6.974  6.952 7.015 6.951 6.940 6.926 6.957  
3 7.051 6.591 6.778 6.618 6.373 6.682  6.937 6.997 6.953 6.941 6.960 6.958  
4 7.114 6.703 6.849 6.754 6.425 6.769  6.831 6.960 6.876 6.861 6.908 6.887  
5 6.708 6.376 6.425 6.397 6.304 6.442  6.810 6.935 6.869 6.839 6.833 6.857  
               
Average 7.149 6.792 6.896 6.805 6.606  0.531 6.918 7.000 6.942 6.929 6.927  -0.016 
       (4.00)***       (-0.60) 
oexpense 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 8.539 8.232 8.019 7.672 8.131 8.119  3.827 4.331 3.906 3.602 3.584 3.850  
2 7.892 7.228 7.220 6.722 7.174 7.247  3.957 4.100 3.974 3.692 3.662 3.877  
3 7.695 6.897 6.911 6.306 6.981 6.958  3.849 3.867 3.514 3.139 3.136 3.501  
4 7.600 6.863 7.027 6.393 6.730 6.923  2.865 3.304 2.970 2.614 2.825 2.916  
5 7.529 6.957 6.785 6.342 6.605 6.844  2.787 3.422 2.965 2.680 2.506 2.872  
               
Average 7.851 7.235 7.192 6.687 7.124  0.719 3.457 3.805 3.466 3.145 3.143  0.192 
       (4.63)***       (1.93)* 
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(Table 7 continued) 
Panel B: Underpricing, holdings of institutional shareholders and number of institutional shareholders split into firm size and management experience quintiles 
Management Experience Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                            SPAC                                                                                                                        Matched Common Stock 
underpricing 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.025 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.024  0.134 0.112 0.085 0.129 0.094 0.111  
2 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.026 0.017  0.128 0.122 0.087 0.130 0.111 0.116  
3 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.023 0.015  0.143 0.126 0.115 0.148 0.111 0.129  
4 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.004 0.022 0.011  0.122 0.109 0.094 0.129 0.118 0.114  
5 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.007 0.025 0.014  0.145 0.128 0.106 0.141 0.114 0.127  
               
Average 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.010 0.025  -0.009 0.134 0.119 0.097 0.135 0.110  0.026 
       (-2.53)**       (2.30)** 
instp 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 0.113 0.195 0.159 0.178 0.133 0.156   0.924 0.909 1.042 0.944 0.945 0.953   
2 0.154 0.238 0.210 0.213 0.172 0.197   0.943 0.902 1.089 0.954 0.944 0.966   
3 0.154 0.246 0.194 0.204 0.170 0.194   1.075 0.981 1.085 1.019 1.022 1.036   
4 0.154 0.246 0.206 0.211 0.179 0.199   1.093 1.057 1.121 1.087 1.088 1.089   
5 0.171 0.264 0.224 0.247 0.206 0.222   1.106 1.026 1.159 1.115 1.037 1.089   
               
Average 0.149  0.238  0.199  0.211  0.172   -0.021 1.028  0.975  1.099  1.024  1.007   0.028 
       (-1.19)       (0.71) 
instn 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1st-5th 
1 3.213 5.600 4.661 6.119 3.123 4.543   25.373 24.421 22.776 28.643 23.550 24.953   
2 5.895 7.690 7.386 7.649 6.140 6.952   27.667 26.579 24.020 29.721 25.516 26.701   
3 6.220 8.483 6.842 8.281 6.182 7.202   29.250 26.633 26.962 32.633 28.088 28.713   
4 5.557 7.625 7.345 8.035 5.561 6.825   30.982 30.295 29.678 34.207 30.647 31.162   
5 6.966 9.630 8.948 10.167 8.000 8.742   37.197 32.746 35.455 37.667 34.712 35.555   
               
Average 5.570  7.806  7.036  8.050  5.801   -0.180 30.094  28.135  27.778  32.574  28.503   2.057 
       (-0.24)       (1.86)* 
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institutional holdings tend to increase as management experience increases, but the difference between 
top and bottom management experience quintiles is not statistically significant. The number of 
institutional investors does not vary much with management experience. 
On the other hand, for matched common stock IPO, we find higher management experience 
leads to lower other offering expenses, underpricing and the number of institutional investors. For top-
tier underwriter dummy, underwriting spread and institutional holdings, the difference between top and 
bottom management experience quintiles is not statistically significant. The difference between other 
offering expenses of firms in the top and the bottom management experience quintiles is 0.192 within 
ten percent significance level. The difference between the underpricing of firms in the top and the 
bottom management experience quintiles is 0.026 within five percent significance level. Finally, the 
difference between the number of institutional investors in the top and the bottom management 
experience quintiles is 2.057 within ten percent significance level.  
4.6 Cross-Sectional Regression of Offer Size on Management Experience, Other Management 
Quality and Reputation: SPAC IPO and Matched Common Stock IPO 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to assess the effect of management experience, 
other management quality and reputation on SPAC or matched common stock IPO offer size.11 We use 
a censored tobit regression as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Our base regression model is as 
follows. 
iiiiiiii odirfagebvabvaermgtmeanOffsize εβββββα ++++++= *ln*2**.exp* 54321 … (1) 
where iα  and iε  is constant term and error components.
12
  
 
                                                 
11 Before we perform the regression analysis, we do the multicollinearity test by calculating Variance Influence Factor 
(VIF) values. On average, VIF value is less than 2 for each regression. If we set the cut-off criterion of the multicollinearity 
at the VIF value of 4, which is a widely used criterion, there is no serious multicollinearity in the sample. We perform this 
test throughout the whole regression analysis. 
12 Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) do not include yeardummy in the regression. We perform regression analysis with 
yeardummy and the result is qualitatively the same as without it. 
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The definition of other variables in equation (1) is the same as ones in Table 2. From our base 
regression model, we add other management quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each firm i. 
We expect positive relationship between management quality and reputation variables and IPO offer 
size (Offsizei) based on our hypothesis 2 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).  
Table 8 shows the tobit regression results of the equation (1). T-statistics are in the parentheses. 
*, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. We find positive 
relationships between meanmgtexper. and lnsize of SPAC IPO. The result is consistent with our 
hypothesis 2 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). However, we find no statistical relationships 
between meanmgtexper. and lnsize of matched common stock IPO except for regression 5. The result 
is not consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard deviation increase 
in meanmgtexper. increases lnsize by 20% (approximately $1.22 million dollars). It seems that the 
average management experience of SPACs signal firm quality so that they attract more outside 
investors and induce larger offer size. However, common stock investors are not attracted by the 
average management experience. 
We find negative relationships between tsize, pfteam, plawacc or tenure and lnsize of SPAC 
IPO. The result is not consistent with our hypothesis 2 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). On the 
other hand, we find a positive relationship between nonprofit and lnsize of SPAC IPO. The result is 
consistent with our hypothesis 2 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard 
deviation increase in nonprofit increases lnsize by 22.31% (approximately $1.25 million dollars). It is 
not management quality itself but management reputation outside business community that induces 
larger offer size for SPAC IPO. We find positive relationships between tsize, pmba, pfteam or tenure 
and lnsize of matched common stock IPO. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in tsize, pmba, pfteam and tenure increases lnsize by 
30.00% (approximately $1.35 million dollars), 21.09% (approximately $1.23 million dollars), 14.36% 
(approximately $1.15 million dollars) and 10.72% (approximately $1.11 million dollars), respectively.
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Table 8 Relationship between offer size and management experience, quality and reputation: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
The censored tobit regression results are provided. The dependent variable is the natural log of IPO offer size (lnsize). Total of 158 observations, 158 SPAC IPOs (152 SPACs) and 158 
matched common stock IPOs from August 2003 till February 2008, are used in the regression analysis. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2. N represents the 
number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. 
SPAC 1 
 
2 3 4 5 
Matched  
Common 1 2 3 
 
4 5 
intercept 4.277 2.735 3.220 2.788 2.756 intercept 2.823 4.306 3.798 3.799 3.972 
 (10.21)*** (8.75)*** (9.23)*** (9.26)*** (9.01)***  (7.44)*** (15.35)*** (11.99)*** (12.92)*** (11.94)*** 
mean- 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.041 0.034 mean- -0.006 -0.019 -0.008 -0.015 -0.021 
mgtexper. (3.08)*** (2.78)*** (3.11)*** (3.04)*** (2.47)** mgtexper. (-0.50) (-1.52) (-0.60) (-1.28) (-1.74)* 
tsize -0.132     tsize 0.088  0.074   
 (-2.79)***      (3.83)***  (3.14)***   
pmba -0.353     pmba 1.315   1.350  
 (-1.28)      (4.25)***   (4.10)***  
pfteam -1.281  -0.884   pfteam 0.869    0.623 
 (-4.35)***  (-2.86)***    (2.70)***    (1.82)* 
plawacc -0.785     plawacc 0.168     
 (-2.02)**      (0.45)     
tenure -1.417   -1.375  tenure 0.044     
 (-3.86)***   (-3.56)***   (1.78)*     
nonprofit 0.081    0.071 nonprofit -0.048     
 (3.19)***    (2.65)***  (-1.76)*     
bva 3.212 3.068 3.002 3.382 2.961 bva 1.591 1.715 1.647 1.678 1.652 
 (7.24)*** (6.40)*** (6.42)*** (7.21)*** (6.29)***  (7.88)*** (7.82)*** (7.70)*** (8.03)*** (7.51)*** 
bva2 -0.894 -0.841 -0.817 -0.943 -0.819 bva2 -0.309 -0.350 -0.339 -0.343 -0.329 
 (-5.95)*** (-5.15)*** (-5.12)*** (-5.90)*** (-5.12)***  (-5.19)*** (-5.32)*** (-5.30)*** (-5.48)*** (-4.99)*** 
lnfage 0.182 -1.642 -1.579 -0.209 -1.493 lnfage -0.085 -0.012 -0.030 -0.024 0.010 
 (0.36) (-4.42)*** (-4.35)*** (-0.39) (-4.06)***  (-1.10) (-0.16) (-0.41) (-0.33) (0.13) 
odir 0.301 0.232 0.250 0.209 0.201 odir -0.108 -0.014 -0.103 0.001 -0.008 
 (5.66)*** (5.25)*** (5.75)*** (4.87)*** (4.47)***  (-2.87)*** (-0.48) (-2.56)** (0.03) (-0.28) 
Pseudo-R2 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 Pseudo-R2 0.26 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.17 
N 158 158 158 158 158 N 158 158 158 158 158 
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Overall, more management experience and higher management team reputation outside 
business community leads to larger IPO offer size for SPAC IPO. However, it is not the case in other 
management quality variables. The result is consistent with industry prediction that management 
experience plays an important role in attracting investors for future SPAC business combination. 
4.7 Cross-Sectional Regression of Underwriter Reputation on Management Experience, Other 
Management Quality and Reputation: SPAC IPO and Matched Common Stock IPO 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to assess the effect of management experience, 
other management quality and reputation on the underwriter reputation of SPAC or matched common 
stock. We use a binary logistic regression. Our base regression model is as follows. We predict a 
positive relationship between management quality or reputation variables and underwriter reputation as 
in our hypothesis 3 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
)'(
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e
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x
x
i Λ=
+
= … (2) 
Λ is the logistic cumulative distribution function. X is a vector of covariates (meanmgtexper., 
bva, bva2, lnfage, and odir).13 The definition of other variables in equation (1) is the same as ones in 
Table 2. From our base regression model, we add other management quality and reputation variables in 
Table 2 for each firm i. 
Table 9 shows the binary logistic regression results of the equation (2). Z-statistics are in the 
parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. Panel A 
shows the regression results of SPAC IPO. Panel B shows the regression results of matched common 
stock IPO. 
No relationships are found between management quality and reputation variables and 
toptierdummy of SPAC IPO, except for odir. There is a positive relationship between odir and 
                                                 
13
 Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) does not include year dummy in their regression equation. We perform the regression 
analysis with year dummy and our results do not change. 
 36 
Table 9 Relationship between underwriter reputation and management experience, quality and reputation: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
The binary logistic regression results are provided. The dependent variable is top-tier underwriter dummy (toptierdummy). Panel A shows the regression results of SPAC IPO. Panel B 
shows the regression results of matched common stock IPO. Total of 158 observations, 158 SPAC IPOs (152 SPACs) and 158 matched common stock IPOs from August 2003 till 
February 2008, are used in the regression analysis. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represents the ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: SPAC 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept -0.635 -0.713 -0.724 -0.703 -0.708 
 (-2.59)*** (-4.07)*** (-3.84)*** (-3.82)*** (-4.08)*** 
meanmgtexper. 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 
 (0.87) (1.40) (1.40) (1.41) (1.09) 
tsize 0.001  0.004   
 (0.04)  (0.16)   
pmba -0.023   -0.025  
 (-0.15)   (-0.17)  
pfteam 0.068     
 (0.38)     
plawacc -0.225     
 (-0.90)     
tenure 0.154     
 (0.36)     
nonprofit 0.017    0.020 
 (1.30)    (1.58) 
bva 0.789 0.811 0.806 0.800 0.786 
 (3.10)*** (3.34)*** (3.30)*** (3.19)*** (3.20)*** 
bva2 -0.208 -0.217 -0.215 -0.214 -0.212 
 (-2.63)*** (-2.82)*** (-2.78)*** (-2.71)*** (-2.75)*** 
lnfage -1.005 -0.813 -0.820 -0.814 -0.744 
 (-1.41) (-3.34)*** (-3.31)*** (-3.34)*** (-3.02)*** 
odir 0.142 0.154 0.151 0.154 0.145 
 (3.73)*** (4.79)*** (4.09)*** (4.79)*** (4.53)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.39 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
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(Table 9 continued) 
Panel B: Matched  
Common Stock 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept -0.696 0.033 -0.291 -0.110 0.032 
 (-2.29)** (0.17) (-1.30) (-0.53) (0.17) 
meanmgtexper. -0.009 -0.015 -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 
 (-1.01) (-1.85)* (-0.95) (-1.67)* (-1.86)* 
tsize 0.062  0.055   
 (2.97)***  (2.77)***   
pmba 0.467   0.469  
 (1.99)**   (1.93)*  
pfteam 0.431     
 (1.74)*     
plawacc 0.134     
 (0.49)     
tenure 0.026     
 (1.21)     
nonprofit -0.013    0.004 
 (-0.58)    (0.21) 
bva 0.632 0.694 0.677 0.676 0.690 
 (2.52)** (2.91)*** (2.93)*** (2.82)*** (2.90)*** 
bva2 -0.107 -0.131 -0.132 -0.127 -0.132 
 (-0.85) (-1.29) (-1.39) (-1.19) (-1.30) 
lnfage -0.060 0.004 -0.018 -0.009 0.005 
 (-0.96) (0.08) (-0.33) (-0.17) (0.09) 
odir -0.031 0.039 -0.027 0.042 0.040 
 (-0.98) (1.84)* (-0.86) (1.97)** (1.84)* 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.12 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
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toptierdummy from regression 1 to regression 5. The result is statistically significant within one 
percent significance level. The positive effect represents the higher probability to involve top-tier 
underwriters. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 3 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). As 
more outside directors are involved in the team, more top-tier underwriters are involved in SPAC IPO. 
It seems that management reputation outside business community, as defined in Chemmanur and 
Paeglis (2005), is important in attracting top-tier underwriters. We calculate the odds ratio from 
logistic regression. For example, as odir increases from 0 to 1 (the number of outside directors in firm i 
increases by one), so do the odds of hiring top-tier underwriter from 0.006 to 0.018 in regression 1.  
For other control variables, we find negative relationships between lnfage and toptierdummy 
from regression 2 to regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within one percent 
significance level. Also, we find positive relationships between bva and toptierdummy from regression 
1 to regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within one percent significance level. 
The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).  
For matched common stock IPO, we find consistent positive relationships between tsize or 
pmba and toptierdummy. Also, we find consistent positive relationships between bva and 
toptierdummy. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, as tsize 
increases from 6 to 7 (one more person joins the management team with six members for firm i), so do 
the odds of hiring top-tier underwriter from 0.286 to 0.412.  
Overall, for SPAC IPO, higher management experience or other management quality variables 
do not attract top-tier underwriters. The result is not consistent with our prediction in a hypothesis 3. 
As we can see from the average toptierdummy in Table 2, comparing with common stock IPO, top-tier 
underwriters seldom participate in SPAC IPO underwriting.  
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4.8 Cross-Sectional Regression of Underwriting Spread or Other Offering Expenses on 
Management Experience, Other Management Quality and Reputation 
: SPAC IPO and Matched Common Stock IPO 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to assess the effect of management experience, 
other management quality and reputation on the underwriting spread or other offering expenses of 
SPAC or matched common stock IPO. We perform Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation as in 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Our base regression models are as follows. 
iiiiiiii odirfagebvabvaermgtmeanSpread εβββββα ++++++= *ln*2**.exp* 54321 … (3) 
iiiiiiii odirfagebvabvaermgtmeanenseO εβββββα ++++++= *ln*2**.exp*exp 54321 … (4) 
where iα  and iε  is constant term and error components.
14
 The definition of other variables in 
equation (1) is the same as ones in Table 2. From our base regression models, we add other 
management quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each firm i. Also, we perform the same 
regression by substituting lnsizei for bvai and bva2i in regression 2. Our prediction is that there is a 
negative relationship between management quality or reputation and underwriting spread or other 
offering expenses as in our hypothesis 4 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
Table 10 shows the regression results of the equation (3). T-statistics are in the parentheses. *, 
**, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. Panel A and B shows the 
regression results of SPAC and matched common stock IPO. We find negative relationships between 
tsize and spread of SPAC IPO in regression 1, 2 and 4. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 4 
and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in tsize decreases 
spread by 31.98%. We cannot find any relationship between other management quality and reputation 
variables and spread. We find negative relationships between lnfage and spread of SPAC IPO in 
regression 3. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 3, one 
standard deviation increase in lnfage decreases spread by 5.08%. 
                                                 
14
 Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) does not include year dummy in their regression equation. We perform the regression 
analysis with year dummy and our results do not change. 
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Table 10 Relationship between underwriting spread and management experience, quality and reputation: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
The OLS regression results are provided. The dependent variable is underwriting spread (spread). Panel A shows the regression results of SPAC IPO. Panel B shows the regression results 
of matched common stock IPO. Total of 158 observations, 158 SPAC IPOs (152 SPACs) and 158 matched common stock IPOs from August 2003 till February 2008, are used in the 
regression analysis. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the ten, five 
and one percent significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: SPAC 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept 8.321 9.176 8.767 9.292 8.506 
 (10.78)*** (9.67)*** (17.04)*** (16.65)*** (14.96)*** 
meanmgtexper. -0.028 -0.022 -0.031 -0.029 -0.032 
 (-1.17) (-0.90) (-1.34) (-1.28) (-1.39) 
tsize -0.169 -0.216  -0.186  
 (-1.93)* (-2.45)**  (-2.27)**  
pmba 0.631 0.692   0.552 
 (1.24) (1.34)   (1.08) 
pfteam 0.754 0.546    
 (1.39) (0.95)    
plawacc 0.802 0.690    
 (1.12) (0.95)    
tenure -0.630 -1.169    
 (-0.93) (-1.73)*    
nonprofit -0.020 -0.012    
 (-0.43) (-0.25)    
bva -2.077  -2.742 -2.490 -2.613 
 (-2.54)**  (-3.48)*** (-3.17)*** (-3.28)*** 
bva2 0.615  0.833 0.750 0.797 
 (2.22)**  (3.10)*** (2.80)*** (2.94)*** 
lnfage -0.238 -0.359 -1.045 -0.858 -0.987 
 (-0.25) (-0.38) (-1.71)* (-1.41) (-1.61) 
odir 0.071 0.119 -0.038 0.100 -0.027 
 (0.73) (1.11) (-0.52) (1.06) (-0.37) 
lnsize  -0.203    
  (-1.61)    
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.15 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
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(Table 10 continued) 
Panel B: Matched  
Common Stock 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept 7.359 8.140 6.972 7.233 6.883 
 (26.01)*** (29.83)*** (36.23)*** (32.77)*** (35.78)*** 
meanmgtexper. 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.015 
 (1.13) (0.85) (1.43) (0.72) (1.84)* 
tsize -0.044 -0.023  -0.038  
 (-2.57)** (-1.38)  (-2.32)**  
pmba 0.169 0.498    
 (0.73) (2.19)**    
pfteam -0.420 -0.215    
 (-1.75)* (-0.93)    
plawacc -0.232 -0.192    
 (-0.82) (-0.72)    
tenure -0.047 -0.034   -0.046 
 (-2.56)** (-1.96)*   (-2.52)** 
nonprofit 0.032 0.016    
 (1.56) (0.85)    
bva -0.489  -0.496 -0.460 -0.536 
 (-3.24)***  (-3.29)*** (-3.09)*** (-3.60)*** 
bva2 0.092  0.101 0.096 0.110 
 (2.06)**  (2.25)** (2.15)** (2.46)** 
lnfage 0.078 0.053 0.008 0.018 0.082 
 (1.36) (0.98) (0.17) (0.35) (1.41) 
odir 0.038 0.008 -0.022 0.023 -0.013 
 (1.37) (0.32) (-1.10) (0.84) (-0.67) 
lnsize  -0.256    
  (-5.53)***    
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.10 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
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For matched common stock IPO, we find negative relationships between tsize, pfteam or tenure 
and spread in regressions 1, 2, 4 and 5. The results are consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in tsize decreases spread by 14.98%. One standard 
deviation increase in pfteam decreases spread by 6.94%. Finally, one standard deviation increase in 
tenure decreases spread by 11.46%. For control variables, there are negative relationships between bva 
or lnsize and spread from regression 1 to regression 5. The results are statistically significant within 
one percent significance level. In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in bva decreases spread 
by 30.92%. In regression 2, one standard deviation increase in lnsize decreases spread by 21.45%. 
Table 11 shows the regression results of the equation (4). T-statistics are in the parentheses. *, 
**, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. Panel A shows the 
regression results of SPAC IPO. Panel B shows the regression results of matched common stock IPO. 
We find negative relationships between meanmgtexper. and oexpense of SPAC IPO in 
regression 1, 3, 4 and 5. Also, we find negative relationships between nonprofit and oexpense of SPAC 
IPO in regression 1, 3, 4 and 5. We substitute lnsize for bva and bva2 to control for the IPO offer size 
instead of firm size as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). We find negative relationships between tsize 
or tenure and oexpense of SPAC IPO in regression 2. The results are consistent with our hypothesis 4 
and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in meanmgtexper. 
decreases oexpense by 36.06%. Also, one standard deviation increase in nonprofit decreases oexpense 
by 43.36%. In regression 2, one standard deviation increase in tsize decreases oexpense by 38.33%. 
One standard deviation increase in tenure decreases oexpense by 75.01%. Finally, we find negative 
relationships between lnsize and oexpense of SPAC IPO in regression 2. One standard deviation 
increase in lnsize decreases oexpense by 103.87%. 
For matched common stock IPO, we find negative relationships between meanmgtexper. and 
oexpense in regressions 2. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 2,
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Table 11 Relationship between offering expenses and management experience, quality and reputation: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
The OLS regression results are provided. The dependent variable is other offering expenses (oexpense). Panel A shows the regression results of SPAC IPO. Panel B shows the regression 
results of matched common stock IPO. Total of 158 observations, 158 SPAC IPOs (152 SPACs) and 158 matched common stock IPOs from August 2003 till February 2008, are used in 
the regression analysis. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the ten, 
five and one percent significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: SPAC 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept 9.912 13.784 10.355 10.752 10.378 
 (8.83)*** (10.65)*** (13.89)*** (13.14)*** (13.87)*** 
meanmgtexper. -0.071 -0.037 -0.083 -0.082 -0.082 
 (-2.07)** (-1.10) (-2.47)** (-2.43)** (-2.43)** 
tsize -0.077 -0.202  -0.141  
 (-0.60) (-1.68)*  (-1.17)  
pmba -0.279 -0.530    
 (-0.38) (-0.75)    
pfteam 1.103 -0.027    
 (1.40) (-0.03)    
plawacc 0.649 -0.093    
 (0.62) (-0.09)    
tenure -1.127 -2.500    
 (-1.15) (-2.71)***    
nonprofit -0.158 -0.092   -0.616 
 (-2.32)** (-1.38)   (-0.64) 
bva -3.380  -4.046 -3.855 -3.905 
 (-2.84)***  (-3.54)*** (-3.34)*** (-3.35)*** 
bva2 0.882  1.084 1.021 1.038 
 (2.19)**  (2.78)*** (2.60)*** (2.61)*** 
lnfage 0.936 0.999 0.115 0.256 0.757 
 (0.68) (0.77) (0.13) (0.29) (0.57) 
odir -0.093 0.172 -0.165 -0.061 -0.175 
 (-0.66) (1.17) (-1.57) (-0.44) (-1.64) 
lnsize  -0.902    
  (-5.23)***    
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.16 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
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(Table 11 continued) 
Panel B: Matched  
Common Stock 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept 4.957 9.739 4.325 5.021 4.294 
 (3.98)*** (9.21)*** (5.21)*** (5.22)*** (5.19)*** 
meanmgtexper. -0.050 -0.060 -0.016 -0.031 -0.027 
 (-1.25) (-1.86)* (-0.44) (-0.83) (-0.73) 
tsize -0.094 0.056  -0.102  
 (-1.24) (0.86)  (-1.42)  
pmba -1.212 1.012    
 (-1.19) (1.15)    
pfteam 0.131 1.586    
 (0.12) (1.77)*    
plawacc 1.334 1.671    
 (1.08) (1.62)    
tenure -0.115 -0.042    
 (-1.41) (-0.63)    
nonprofit 0.173 0.098   0.135 
 (1.94)* (1.36)   (1.53) 
bva -2.707  -2.580 -2.486 -2.696 
 (-4.08)***  (-3.97)*** (-3.82)*** (-4.14)*** 
bva2 0.550  0.562 0.547 0.558 
 (2.80)***  (2.89)*** (2.82)*** (2.88)*** 
lnfage 0.367 0.233 0.144 0.168 0.145 
 (1.44) (1.11) (0.65) (0.76) (0.66) 
odir 0.080 -0.093 -0.067 0.054 -0.055 
 (0.65) (-0.93) (-0.78) (0.44) (-0.64) 
lnsize  -1.710    
  (-9.55)***    
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.40 0.11 0.12 0.12 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
 
 
 45 
one standard deviation increase in meanmgtexper. decreases oexpense by 24.03%. For control 
variables, there are negative relationships between bva or lnsize and oexpense from regression 1 to 
regression 5. The results are statistically significant within one percent significance level. The results 
are consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in 
bva decreases oexpense by 171.22%. In regression 2, one standard deviation increase in lnsize 
decreases oexpense by 143.45%. 
We find consistent negative relationships between IPO offer size (lnsize) and underwriting 
expenses (spread or oexpense) both for SPAC IPO and for matched common stock IPO. The results 
are consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) and the argument of economies of scale in 
underwriting (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2000). Overall, for SPAC IPO, management experience does not 
have any statistically significant relationship with underwriting spread even though the sign is negative. 
However, it has negative relationship with other offering expenses for SPAC IPO with statistical 
significance.  
4.9 Cross-Sectional Regression of Underpricing on Management Experience, Other Management 
Quality and Reputation: SPAC IPO and Matched Common Stock IPO 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to assess the effect of management experience, 
other management quality and reputation on SPAC or matched common stock IPO underpricing. We 
perform OLS estimation as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).15 Our base regression model is as 
follows. 
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15
 Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) winsorize underpricing at the 1st and the 99th percentile. We run the regressions with 
winsorization and the results do not change. So, we report the regression results without winsorization. Chemmnur and 
Paeglis (2005) use the residuals from the regression of underwriter reputation on management quality and reputation 
variables to fix the effect of high correlation between them. However, we do not see high correlation between them in our 
sample. So, we use underwriter reputation (toptierdummy) in the regression. Also, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score 
tells us that no multicorrelation problem. 
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where iα  and iε  is constant term and error components. Year dummies are included in the 
regression. The definition of other variables in equation (1) is the same as ones in Table 2. From our 
base regression model, we add other management quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each 
firm i. We expect a positive relationship between SPAC management quality and underpricing, while a 
negative relationship is expected between the management quality of matched common stock and 
underpricing as in our hypothesis 1.  
Table 12 shows the OLS regression results of the equation (5). T-statistics are in the 
parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. The 
coefficients of year dummies are not reported. 
We find positive relationships between meanmgtexper. and underpricing of SPAC IPO. Also, we find 
positive relationships between tsize and underpricing of SPAC IPO. The relationships are statistically 
significant within five percent significance level. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 1 and our 
discussion in section 2. In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in meanmgtexper. increases 
underpricing by 0.65%. If we translate this increase into “money left on the table” defined as in 
Loughran and Ritter (2002), it increases by the amount of $734.32. Also, one standard deviation 
increase in tsize increases underpricing by 0.81%. Similarly, it is translated into the increase of 
$915.08 for “money left on the table”. For control variables, there is a negative relationship between 
bva and underpricing. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, 
one standard deviation increase in bva decreases underpricing by 3.34%. It seems that the average 
management experience and management team size of SPACs are valued by the IPO market by 
signaling firm quality. However, other management quality and reputation variables are not valued by 
the IPO market for SPAC IPO. 
 For matched common stock IPO, we do not find any relationship between meanmgtexper. and 
underpricing. The result implies that average management experience is valuable in special issues like
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Table 12 Relationship between underpricing and management experience, quality and reputation: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
The OLS regression results are provided. The dependent variable is IPO underpricing (underpricing). Total of 158 observations, 158 SPAC IPOs (152 SPACs) and 158 matched common 
stock IPOs from August 2003 till February 2008, are used in the regression analysis. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2. N represents the number of observations. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. The coefficients of year dummies are not reported. 
SPAC 1 2 3 4 
Matched 
Common Stock 1 2 3 4 
intercept -0.031 -0.032 -0.011 -0.011 Intercept 0.066 0.090 0.075 0.134 
 (-0.68) (-0.70) (-0.27) (-0.27)  (0.30) (0.41) (0.37) (0.68) 
meanmgtexper. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 meanmgtexper. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (1.89)* (1.85)* (1.80)* (1.87)*  (-0.39) (-0.26) (-0.39) (0.18) 
tsize 0.005 0.005   tsize -0.001 -0.003   
 (2.33)** (2.49)**    (-0.28) (-0.54)   
pmba 0.005 0.005   pmba -0.051 -0.070   
 (0.39) (0.35)    (-0.54) (-0.73)   
pfteam 0.002 0.004 -0.001  pfteam 0.187 0.176 0.159  
 (0.10) (0.25) (-0.09)   (1.91)* (1.79)* (1.70)*  
plawacc -0.004 -0.005   plawacc -0.077 -0.081   
 (-0.20) (-0.22)    (-0.65) (-0.69)   
tenure 0.023 0.021   tenure 0.014 0.013   
 (1.22) (1.13)    (1.86)* (1.75)*   
nonprofit -0.002 -0.001  -0.001 nonprofit -0.020 -0.020  -0.018 
 (-1.24) (-1.08)  (-0.67)  (-2.43)** (-2.44)**  (-2.27)** 
bva -0.071 -0.068 -0.058 -0.057 bva 0.029 0.012 -0.019 0.011 
 (-3.06)*** (-2.88)*** (-2.56)** (-2.53)**  (0.48) (0.19) (-0.31) (0.18) 
bva2 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.017 bva2 -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.002 
 (2.69)*** (2.58)** (2.20)** (2.18)**  (-0.16) (0.06) (0.20) (-0.11) 
lnfage -0.010 -0.017 0.010 0.008 lnfage -0.004 -0.003 0.017 0.011 
 (-0.37) (-0.63) (0.50) (0.42)  (-0.17) (-0.15) (0.83) (0.52) 
toptierdummy  -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 toptierdummy  0.047 0.043 0.048 
  (-1.19) (-1.03) (-0.87)   (1.27) (1.20) (1.36) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 
N 158 158 158 158 N 158 158 158 158 
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SPAC IPO. However, we find negative relationships between nonprofit and underpricing, while we 
find positive relationships between pfteam or tenure and underpricing. The result is not consistent with 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). It seems that management reputation outside business community 
leads to lower underpricing, while other management quality does not. In regression 1, one standard 
deviation increase in nonprofit decreases underpricing by 3.96%. It is translated into the reduction of 
$4,473.70 for “money left on the table”. 
Overall, consistent with firm quality signaling argument, our result implies that management 
quality (management experience and management team size) signals firm quality to the market through 
underpricing for SPAC IPO. However, it is not the case for matched common stock IPO. 
4.10 Cross-Sectional Regression of Institutional Interest on Management Experience, Other 
Management Quality and Reputation: SPAC IPO and Matched Common Stock IPO 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to assess the effect of management experience, 
other management quality and reputation on the institutional interest in SPAC or matched common 
stock IPO. We use two institutional interest variables as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005): the natural 
logarithm of the percentage of the offer allocated to institutional investors at the end of the first quarter 
after the IPO (instp) and that of the number of institutional investors at the end of the first quarter after 
going public (instn). We use censored tobit regression as in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).16 Our 
base regression model is as follows. 
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where iα  and iε  is constant term and error components. The definition of other variables in 
equation (1) is the same as ones in Table 2. From our base regression model, we add other 
management quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each firm i. Also, we substitute instni for 
instpi as the alternative institutional interest dependent variable. We predict positive relationships 
                                                 
16
 Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) do not include year dummy variables. We run the regressions with year dummies and the 
results do not change.  
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between management quality or reputation variables and institutional interest as in hypothesis 4 and 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
Table 13 shows the OLS regression results of the equation (6). T-statistics are in the 
parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. We find 
positive relationships between tsize and instp or instn of SPAC IPO in regression 1, 3, 4 and 6. The 
relationship is statistically significant within five or one percent significance level. The result is 
consistent with our hypothesis 4 and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard 
deviation increase in tsize increases instp by 6.19%. In regression 4, one standard deviation increase in 
tsize increases instn by 278.29%, more than doubling the number of institutional investors. It seems 
that management team size is important factor in attracting institutional investors.  
For control variables, we find positive relationships between toptierdummy and instp or instn of 
SPAC IPO from regression 1 to regression 8. The relationships are statistically significant within one 
percent significance level. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, 
one standard deviation increase in toptierdummy increases instp by 7.47%. Also, in regression 4, one 
standard deviation increase in toptierdummy increases instn by 355.24%, more than tripling the 
number of institutional investors. As in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), underwriter reputation is 
important factor in attracting the institutional investors of SPAC IPO as well as the institutional 
investors of common stock IPO. We find negative relationships between lnfage and instp or instn of 
SPAC IPO in regression 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. The relationships are statistically significant within five or 
one percent significance level. In regression 2, one standard deviation increase in lnfage decreases 
instp by 9.66%. In regression 5, one standard deviation increase in lnfage decreases instn by 447.35%, 
more than four times reduction in the number of institutional investors. For SPACs, firm age is less 
than one year. If we consider this firm age as the preparation time for going public, higher firm age can 
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Table 13 Relationship between institutional interest and management experience, quality and reputation: SPAC vs. Matched common stock 
The censored tobit regression results are provided. The dependent variables is the natural log of the percentage of the offer allocated to institutional investors (instp) and the number of 
institutional investors (instn) as reported in SEC 13-F filings at the end of the first quarter after the IPO, respectively. Panel A shows the regression results of SPAC IPO. Panel B shows 
the regression results of matched common stock IPO. Total of 158 observations, 158 SPAC IPOs (152 SPACs) and 158 matched common stock IPOs from August 2003 till February 2008, 
are used in the regression analysis. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 2. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
represents the ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: SPAC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Variable INSTP INSTP INSTP INSTN INSTN INSTN INSTN INSTN 
intercept 0.017 0.181 0.029 2.608 7.045 -0.248 6.326 6.694 
 (0.11) (1.84)* (0.25) (0.45) (1.84)* (-0.06) (1.51) (1.75)* 
meanmgtexper. -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.087 -0.078 -0.085 -0.083 -0.100 
 (-0.21) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.49) (-0.43) (-0.49) (-0.45) (-0.54) 
tsize 0.033  0.032 1.467  1.531   
 (2.31)**  (2.45)** (2.71)***  (3.08)***   
pmba 0.125   1.906   1.690  
 (1.22)   (0.49)   (0.42)  
pfteam -0.042   -4.666     
 (-0.39)   (-1.14)     
plawacc -0.055   -2.789     
 (-0.39)   (-0.50)     
tenure 0.072   0.547     
 (0.38)   (0.06)     
nonprofit 0.006   0.165    0.346 
 (0.61)   (0.46)    (0.99) 
toptierdummy 0.164 0.212 0.166 7.795 9.816 7.637 9.888 9.211 
 (2.77)*** (3.77)*** (2.86)*** (3.48)*** (4.54)*** (3.49)*** (4.56)*** (4.12)*** 
bva 0.165 0.217 0.147 16.627 20.037 16.525 20.496 19.349 
 (0.97) (1.27) (0.88) (2.53)** (3.00)*** (2.56)** (3.03)*** (2.90)*** 
bva2 -0.058 -0.078 -0.055 -4.539 -5.720 -4.554 -5.849 -5.539 
 (-1.02) (-1.36) (-0.97) (-2.10)** (-2.58)*** (-2.12)** (-2.61)*** (-2.50)** 
lnfage -0.402 -0.312 -0.331 -19.741 -19.344 -19.926 -19.196 -18.286 
 (-1.32) (-2.08)** (-2.29)** (-1.34) (-3.13)*** (-3.39)*** (-3.09)*** (-2.95)*** 
LR 34.91 26.61 32.47 59.14 48.09 57.18 48.27 49.06 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
N 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
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(Table 13 continued) 
Panel B:  
Matched Common Stock 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Variable INSTP INSTP INSTP INSTN INSTN INSTN INSTN INSTN 
intercept 0.577 1.091 0.738 4.194 25.182 24.637 17.631 24.734 
 
(1.28) (3.86)*** (2.08)** (0.34) (3.21)*** (2.48)** (2.15)** (3.19)*** 
meanmgtexper. 0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.186 -0.394 -0.391 -0.323 -0.268 
 
(0.52) (-0.42) (-0.24) (-0.49) (-1.06) (-1.04) (-0.88) (-0.71) 
tsize 0.033  0.031 0.386  0.048   
 
(1.61)  (1.61) (0.70)  (0.09)   
pmba 0.778   27.158   26.373  
 
(2.10)**   (2.70)***   (2.57)**  
pfteam -0.145   20.846     
 
(-0.38)   (2.01)**     
plawacc -0.490   -13.111     
 
(-1.09)   (-1.08)     
tenure -0.006   0.508     
 
(-0.21)   (0.63)     
nonprofit -0.045   -1.729    -1.573 
 
(-1.42)   (-2.01)**    (-1.77)* 
toptierdummy 0.381 0.478 0.420 10.814 13.592 13.503 12.226 13.675 
 
(2.78)*** (3.59)*** (3.07)*** (2.90)*** (3.68)*** (3.53)*** (3.35)*** (3.75)*** 
bva 0.212 0.178 0.175 22.771 22.917 22.911 22.883 24.199 
 
(0.86) (0.72) (0.71) (3.40)*** (3.33)*** (3.33)*** (3.39)*** (3.53)*** 
bva2 -0.054 -0.040 -0.055 -4.074 -4.638 -4.661 -4.525 -4.634 
 
(-0.75) (-0.56) (-0.77) (-2.11)** (-2.33)** (-2.32)** (-2.32)** (-2.35)** 
lnfage -0.162 -0.152 -0.160 -2.136 -1.762 -1.774 -1.953 -1.777 
 
(-1.77)* (-1.87)* (-1.98)** (-0.86) (-0.78) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.80) 
LR 28.94 18.82 21.39 52.56 36.04 36.05 42.52 39.15 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
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be interpreted as the delay in going public. As a SPAC starts with a blank check company, institutional 
investors worry about the success of going public as its firm age increases. So, their interest in a SPAC 
IPO will decrease as time goes by, i.e., firm age increases. 
For matched common stock IPO, we find positive relationships between pmba and instp or 
instn. Also, we find positive relationships between pfteam and instn. The relationships are statistically 
significant within five or ten percent significance level. In regression 1, one standard deviation increase 
in pmba increases instp by 12.48%. In regression 4, one standard deviation increase in pfteam increases 
instn by 344.37%, close to 3.5 times increase in the number of institutional investors. The results are 
consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
For control variables, there are positive relationships between toptierdummy and instp or instn. 
The relationships are statistically significant within five or one percent significance level. The results 
are consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in 
toptierdummy increases instp by 17.97%. In regression 4, one standard deviation increase in 
toptierdummy increases instn by 509.78%, five times increase in the number of institutional investors.  
Overall, both for SPAC IPO and matched common stock IPO, Management team size (tsize), 
Management team members whose prior position is vice president or higher (pfteam), those with MBA 
degrees (pmba) and top-tier underwriter dummy (toptierdummy) certify firm’s quality, resulting in the 
reduction of outsiders’ information acquisition costs about the firm. So, the firm becomes attractive to 
institutional investors.  
4.11 Summary Statistics: Management Quality, Reputation and the Success of Business 
Combinations 
 
Table 14 shows the summary statistics of the sample. The sample size is different based on 
dependent variables. The sample consists of 53 SPAC business combinations when dependent variable 
is time-to-deal. It involves 53 SPAC business combinations when dependent variable is long-term
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Table 14 Summary statistics: management quality, reputation and the success of business combinations 
Summary statistics results are presented. Ttdma, ttdipoma, ttdipo represents time-to-deal in years from the announcement date till consummation date of 
SPAC business combination, from the initial filing date of SPAC IPO till the consummation date of SPAC business combination, and from the initial 
filing date till the consummation date of SPAC IPO, respectively. Ltpmau, ltpipomau, ltpipou represents unit price performance from the announcement 
date till consummation date of SPAC business combination, from SPAC IPO till the consummation date of SPAC business combination, and from the 
SPAC IPO date till the announcement of SPAC business combination, respectively.  They are constructed by calculating Fama and Macbeth (1973) 
regression alpha of monthly average unit price on monthly Carhart (1997) four factors. Sindicator is equal to one if SPAC consummated business 
combination, is equal to two if SPAC liquidated, and is equal to three if SPAC business combination is in progress. ACAR(-1,1), ACAR(-2,2), ACAR(-5,5) 
represents unit cumulative abnormal return (CAR), as in Brown and Warner (1985), around the announcement of SPAC business combination. CCAR(-
1,1), CCAR(-2,2), CCAR(-5,5) represents unit CAR around the consummation of SPAC business combination. Event window is (-1,1), (-2,2) and (-5,5), 
respectively. The percentage of non-negative CARs is in a bracket. Instna or instnc represents the number of institutional investors at the end of the first 
quarter following SPAC business combination announcement or consummation, respectively. Instpa or instpc represents the ratio of the institutional 
ownership to IPO unit offering amount at the end of the first quarter following SPAC business combination announcement or consummation. 
Meanmgtexper. is the mean industry experience of management team, underpricing is the IPO underpricing, tsize is the management team size, pmba is 
the the percentage of MBAs, pfteam is the percentage of management team members with the prior experience of vice presidents or higher, plawacc is the 
percentage of lawyers or accountants, tenure is the mean tenure of management team, tenhet is the coefficient of variation of the team member’s tenures, 
nonprofit is the number of management team members who sit on non-profit boards, odir is the number of outside directors as defined in Chemmanur and 
Paeglis (2005). Lnbva, bva and bva2 represents the natural log of book value of total assets, book value of total assets and the squared term of bva, 
respectively. Lnfage is the natural log of firm age defined as the period from firm’s founding date till firm’s IPO date. Toptierdummy is equal to one if IPO 
involves top-tier underwriters with Carter and Manaster’s reputation ranking of eight or higher; otherwise, it is zero. N represents the number of 
observations (from September 2003 until May 2008 and, for Sindicator, until November 2008). 
  N Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables      
Time to deal(years)      
ttdma 53 0.66 0.54 0.33 0.17 1.75 
ttdipoma 53 1.64 1.80 0.46 0.68 2.75 
ttdipo 53 0.99 1.07 0.46 0.21 1.73 
Long-term SPAC unit price performance     
ltpmau 51 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.01 0.01 
ltpipomau 51 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.01 0.002 
ltpipou 53 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.01 
Deal success dummy      
sindicator 158 2.194 3 0.908 1 3 
CAR aournd SPAC Business Combination Announcement Date 
ACAR(-1,1) 51 [66.67%] 0.06 0.002 0.10 -0.01 0.44 
ACAR(-2,2) 51 [64.71%] 0.07 0.003 0.12 -0.13 0.49 
ACAR(-5,5) 51 [56.86%] 0.07 0.006 0.15 -0.16 0.70 
CAR around SPAC Business Combination Consummation Date 
CCAR(-1,1) 49 [34.69%] -0.03 -0.002 0.14 -0.50 0.39 
CCAR(-2,2) 49 [36.73%] -0.03 -0.005 0.16 -0.51 0.39 
CCAR(-5,5) 49 [44.90%] -0.03 -0.001 0.15 -0.50 0.36 
Institutional Interest after SPAC Business Announcement and Consummation 
instna 53 9.55 3 15 0 71 
instpa 53 0.25 0.10 0.30 0 1.09 
instnc 53 12.83 5 17.64 0 80 
instpc 53 0.50 0.30 0.61 0 2.53 
Explanatory Variables      
meanmgtexper 158 19.13 18.68 5.09 6.86 33 
underpricing 158 0.02 0.004 0.04 -0.05 0.25 
tsize 158 6.09 6 1.9 2 13 
mba 158 0.34 0.31 0.23 0 1 
executive 158 0.71 0.75 0.22 0 1 
lawacct 158 0.21 0.2 0.17 0 0.75 
tenure 158 0.57 0.49 0.3 0.19 2.33 
tenhet 158 0.11 0 0.18 0 0.91 
nonprofit 158 1.85 1 2.74 0 15 
Control Variables 
toptierdummy 158 0.29 0 0.46 0 1 
Lnbva 158 5.37 5.4 0.4 4.29 6.51 
bva 158 0.36 0.25 0.47 0.02 3.26 
bva2 158 0.35 0.06 1.33 0 10.6 
lnfage 158 -0.57 -0.61 0.5 -1.39 1.61 
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SPAC unit price performance.17 It is 158 SPAC IPOs when dependent variable is success indicator. It 
is 51 SPAC business combinations when dependent variable is CAR around SPAC business 
announcement date. It is 49 SPAC business combinations when dependent variable is CAR around 
SPAC business consummation date. Finally, it is 53 SPAC business combinations when dependent 
variables are the number of institutional investors or the ratio of the institutional ownership to IPO unit 
offering amount at the end of the first quarter following SPAC business combination announcement 
(instna or instpa) or consummation (instnc or instpc). Explanatory variables are meanmgtexper., other 
management quality and reputation variables and underpricing. Control variables are toptierdummy, 
bva, bva2 and lnfage. 'N’ is the number of observations. Sample period is from September 2003 until 
May 2008 (from September 2003 until November 2008 when we use sindicator as a dependent 
variable). The percentage of non-negative CARs is in square bracket.  
The average ttdma is 0.66 (median, 0.54). The average ttdipoma is 1.64 (median, 1.80). Finally, 
the average ttdipo is 0.99 (median, 1.07). It takes longer time for SPACs to go public than to 
consummate SPAC business combination from the announcement date. The average ltpmau is -0.002 
(median, -0.003). Finally, the average ltpipou is -0.002 (median, -0.003). The average unit price 
performance does not vary much from the initial filing of IPO till the consummation of SPAC business 
combination. The average sindicator is 2.194 (median, 3). More than half of SPAC IPO is still in 
progress of finding the target of business combination. More SPACs are successful (53 SPAC IPOs, 49 
SPACs) than they are liquidated (23 SPAC IPOs, 21 SPACs) in the sample.  
The average ACAR(-1,1) is 0.06 (median, 0.002). The average ACAR(-2,2) is 0.07 (median, 
0.003). Finally, the average ACAR(-5,5) is 0.07 (median, 0.007). As we can see from the pattern, CARs 
around the announcement of SPAC business combination are positive and increasing as event window 
                                                 
17
 There is a discrepancy in the number of observations between ltpipou (53 observations) and ltpmau or ltpipomau (51 
observations). It is because KBL Healthcare Acquisition Corp. II Unit (Symbol: KBLHU) and Healthcare Acquisition Corp. 
Unit (Symbol: HAQ.U) do not have enough unit price record to calculate the long-term unit price performance after SPAC 
business combination announcement  
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increases. The average CCAR(-1,1) is -0.03 (median, -0.002). The average CCAR(-2,2) is -0.03 
(median, -0.005). Finally, the average CCAR(-5,5) is -0.03 (median, -0.001). Average CARs are all 
negative and don’t change as event window increases around the consummation of SPAC business 
combination. 
The average instna is 9.55 (median, 3). The average instnc is 12.83 (median, 5). As we can see 
from the pattern, the average number of institutional investors is higher when SPAC business 
combinations are consummated. The average instpa is 0.25 (median, 0.10). The average instpc is 0.5 
(median, 0.3). By the same token, the average ratio of institutional ownership to IPO unit offering 
amount is higher when SPAC business combinations are consummated. When we compare the above-
mentioned results with average instn (6.89) and instp (0.19) at the end of the first quarter following 
SPAC IPO in Table 2, we can observe substantial increase in institutional interest. 
Overall, the average time-to-deal is longer for IPO than for business combination. Also, the 
average long-term unit price performance does not change from IPO till business combination. More 
success than failure in SPAC business combination even though more than half of the sample is still in 
progress of finding the target of business combination. Average CARs are positive and increasing 
around SPAC business combination announcement date, while those are negative and don’t change 
around SPAC business combination consummation date. Finally, the average institutional interest 
substantially increases throughout SPAC business combination process, comparing with that after 
SPAC IPO. 
4.12 Correlation: Management Quality, Reputation and the Success of Business Combinations 
Table 15 shows the correlation results among variables. Panel A shows the correlation results 
when dependent variable is time-to-deal. Panel B shows the correlation results when dependent 
variable is long-term unit price performance. Panel C shows the correlation results when dependent 
variable is success indicator. Panel D or E shows the correlation results when dependent variable is 
cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC business combination announcement (panel D) or 
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Table 15 Pearson correlation: Time-to-deal, long-term unit price performance, success indicator, cumulative abnormal return and 
institutional interest 
Pearson correlation results of variables used in regression analyses from Table 14 are provided. P-values are in parentheses. a, b and c represents ten, five and one percent significance 
level, respectively.  
Panel A: Dependent variables=Time to deal 
 ttdma ttdipoma ttdipo meanmg under- tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet non- toptier- bva lnfage 
     -texper. pricing       profit dummy   
ttdma 1               
                
ttdipoma 0.349 1              
 (0.011)b               
ttdipo -0.373 0.740 1             
 (0.006)c (<.001)c              
meanmg -0.226 -0.349 -0.183 1            
-texper. (0.104) (0.010)c (0.189)             
under- -0.195 -0.073 0.068 0.222 1           
pricing (0.162) (0.604) (0.629) (0.110)            
tsize -0.093 0.013 0.080 0.103 0.178 1          
 (0.509) (0.925) (0.571) (0.465) (0.203)           
pmba 0.023 0.152 0.134 -0.122 -0.039 -0.015 1         
 (0.870) (0.278) (0.340) (0.385) (0.783) (0.913)          
pfteam 0.010 0.037 0.030 0.059 0.083 -0.217 -0.061 1        
 (0.945) (0.790) (0.831) (0.675) (0.557) (0.119) (0.666)         
plawacc -0.226 -0.152 0.012 -0.149 -0.065 0.037 -0.063 -0.013 1       
 (0.103) (0.278) (0.931) (0.288) (0.644) (0.792) (0.656) (0.927)        
tenure 0.133 0.098 0.001 0.295 -0.067 0.037 0.106 0.050 -0.190 1      
 (0.343) (0.487) (0.994) (0.032)b (0.634) (0.793) (0.450) (0.724) (0.173)       
tenhet -0.205 -0.174 -0.025 0.278 0.269 0.450 -0.177 -0.031 0.0004 0.063 1     
 (0.141) (0.212) (0.857) (0.044)b (0.052)a (0.001)c (0.206) (0.826) (0.998) (0.656)      
non- -0.242 -0.294 -0.118 0.184 0.099 0.148 -0.063 0.099 -0.075 -0.188 0.270 1    
profit (0.081)a (0.032)b (0.401) (0.186) (0.481) (0.290) (0.652) (0.479) (0.593) (0.177) (0.051)a     
toptier- -0.223 -0.440 -0.276 0.196 0.153 0.204 -0.134 0.135 0.061 0.072 0.504 0.322 1   
dummy (0.108) (0.001)c (0.046)b (0.159) (0.275) (0.144) (0.338) (0.334) (0.666) (0.608) (<.001)c (0.019)b    
bva -0.012 -0.336 -0.325 0.327 0.192 0.449 -0.230 -0.017 -0.147 0.397 0.595 0.183 0.462 1  
 (0.934) (0.014)b (0.018)b (0.017)b (0.169) (0.001)c (0.097)a (0.901) (0.295) (0.003)c (<.001)c (0.189) (0.001)c   
lnfage 0.078 0.018 -0.039 0.362 0.039 0.161 0.011 0.056 -0.202 0.954 0.316 -0.119 0.219 0.560 1 
 (0.577) (0.899) (0.784) (0.008)c (0.784) (0.250) (0.941) (0.689) (0.147) (<.001)c (0.021)b (0.398) (0.115) (<.001)c  
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(Table 15 continued) 
Panel B: Dependent variables=Long-term unit price performance 
 ltpmau ltpipoma
u 
ltpipou meanmg under- tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet non- toptier- bva lnfage 
     -texper. pricing       profit dummy   
ltpmau 1               
                
ltpipoma
u 
0.720 1              
 (<.001)c               
ltpipou 0.277 0.738 1             
 (0.049)b (<.001)c              
meanmg -0.165 -0.284 -0.234 1            
-texper. (0.248) (0.044)b (0.099)a             
under- 0.178 0.092 0.041 0.248 1           
pricing (0.213) (0.521) (0.778) (0.079)a            
tsize -0.122 -0.370 -0.368 0.077 0.199 1          
 (0.395) (0.008)c (0.008)c (0.594) (0.161)           
pmba 0.100 0.096 -0.052 -0.076 -0.066 0.015 1         
 (0.487) (0.504) (0.716) (0.594) (0.645) (0.916)          
pfteam 0.097 0.114 0.039 0.021 0.105 -0.272 -0.016 1        
 (0.499) (0.427) (0.784) (0.884) (0.462) (0.054)a (0.909)         
plawacc 0.079 0.213 -0.008 -0.178 -0.054 -0.0004 -0.040 -0.047 1       
 (0.579) (0.133) (0.956) (0.211) (0.709) (0.998) (0.781) (0.744)        
tenure -0.169 -0.381 -0.288 0.295 -0.064 0.023 0.117 0.040 -0.204 1      
 (0.236) (0.006)c (0.041)b (0.036)b (0.658) (0.870) (0.415) (0.783) (0.152)       
tenhet -0.047 -0.250 -0.276 0.263 0.283 0.452 -0.154 -0.052 -0.010 0.060 1     
 (0.745) (0.076)a (0.050)b (0.062)a (0.044)b (0.001)c (0.280) (0.716) (0.944) (0.674)      
non- 0.130 0.044 -0.106 0.187 0.102 0.129 -0.068 0.090 -0.093 -0.197 0.275 1    
profit (0.363) (0.758) (0.458) (0.190) (0.475) (0.365) (0.637) (0.532) (0.514) (0.166) (0.051)a     
toptier- 0.092 -0.055 -0.093 0.200 0.155 0.199 -0.140 0.133 0.054 0.069 0.509 0.318 1   
dummy (0.522) (0.701) (0.518) (0.160) (0.278) (0.163) (0.329) (0.352) (0.706) (0.629) (<.001)c (0.023)b    
bva -0.210 -0.353 -0.240 0.311 0.208 0.435 -0.210 -0.049 -0.174 0.394 0.592 0.177 0.463 1  
 (0.139) (0.011)b (0.090)a (0.026)b (0.143) (0.001)c (0.139) (0.732) (0.223) (0.004)c (<.001)c (0.215) (0.001)c   
lnfage -0.180 -0.438 -0.345 0.359 0.045 0.149 0.023 0.043 -0.218 0.954 0.314 -0.127 0.217 0.557 1 
 (0.205) (0.001)c (0.013)b (0.010)c (0.756) (0.297) (0.873) (0.765) (0.125) (<.001)c (0.025)b (0.376) (0.127) (<.001)c  
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(Table 15 continued) 
Panel C: Dependent variables=Success indicator 
 sindicator meanmg under- tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet non- toptier- bva lnfage 
   -texper. pricing       profit dummy   
sindicator 1             
              
meanmg 0.269 1            
-texper. (0.001)c             
under- -0.037 0.146 1           
pricing (0.646) (0.066)a            
tsize 0.278 0.110 0.024 1          
 (<.001)c (0.167) (0.763)           
pmba -0.033 -0.039 0.063 -0.159 1         
 (0.675) (0.621) (0.432) (0.045)b          
pfteam 0.078 0.095 -0.026 -0.019 -0.077 1        
 (0.327) (0.234) (0.741) (0.811) (0.332)         
plawacc -0.095 -0.157 -0.029 0.041 -0.102 -0.116 1       
 (0.232) (0.047)b (0.715) (0.607) (0.197) (0.145)        
tenure 0.277 0.219 0.069 -0.009 -0.156 0.031 -0.129 1      
 (<.001)c (0.006)c (0.386) (0.915) (0.049)b (0.699) (0.103)       
tenhet 0.134 0.127 -0.055 0.421 -0.125 0.059 0.034 -0.022 1     
 (0.092)a (0.110) (0.491) (<.001)c (0.116) (0.457) (0.665) (0.787)      
non- 0.146 0.129 -0.092 0.337 -0.076 0.205 -0.063 -0.181 0.306 1    
profit (0.065)a (0.104) (0.246) (<.001)c (0.340) (0.009)c (0.428) (0.022)b (<.001)c     
toptier- 0.357 0.101 -0.167 0.366 -0.097 0.122 -0.025 -0.189 0.222 0.354 1   
dummy (<.001)c (0.205) (0.035)b (<.001)c (0.222) (0.125) (0.757) (0.017)b (0.005)c (<.001)c    
bva 0.167 0.104 -0.112 0.161 -0.155 0.045 0.058 0.222 0.379 0.127 0.209 1  
 (0.035)b (0.191) (0.157) (0.042)b (0.050)b (0.570) (0.464) (0.005)c (<.001)c (0.110) (0.008)c     
lnfage 0.311 0.232 0.039 0.129 -0.160 0.048 -0.076 0.807 0.152 -0.101 -0.165 0.248 1 
 (<.001)c (0.003)c (0.622) (0.105) (0.043)b (0.549) (0.342) (<.001)c (0.055)a (0.205) (0.037)b (0.002)c  
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(Table 15 continued) 
Panel D: Dependent variables=Cumulative Abnormal Return around SPAC business combination announcement 
 ACAR ACAR ltpipou meanm- under- tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet non- toptier- bva lnfage 
  (-1,1) (-2,2)  gtexper. pricing       profit dummy   
ACAR 1               
(-1,1)                
ACAR 0.864 1              
(-2,2) (<.001)c               
ltpipou 0.631 0.584 1             
 
(<.001)c (<.001)c  
            
meanm- -0.156 -0.184 -0.220 1            
gtexper. (0.275) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.114) 
 
            
under- 0.009 -0.041 
 
0.036 0.222 1           
pricing (0.948) 
 
(0.777) 
 
(0.800) 
 
(0.110) 
 
           
tsize -0.226 
 
-0.207 -0.334 0.103 0.178 1          
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.015)b 
 
(0.465) 
 
(0.203) 
          
pmba 0.037 0.031 -0.056 -0.122 -0.039 -0.015 1         
 
(0.797) (0.828) (0.689) (0.385) (0.783) (0.913 
         
pfteam 0.120 0.087 0.054 0.059 0.083 -0.217 -0.061 1        
 
(0.401) (0.546) (0.702) (0.675) (0.557) (0.119) (0.666) 
        
plawacc -0.313 -0.220 0.009 -0.149 -0.065 0.037 -0.063 -0.013 1       
 
(0.026)b (0.121) (0.952) (0.288) (0.644) (0.792) (0.656) (0.927) 
       
tenure -0.083 -0.035 -0.279 0.295 -0.067 0.037 0.106 0.050 -0.190 1      
 
(0.564) (0.806) (0.043)b (0.032)b (0.634) (0.793) (0.450) (0.724) (0.173) 
      
tenhet -0.047 -0.035 -0.270 0.278 0.269 0.450 -0.177 -0.031 0.0004 0.063 1     
 
(0.741) (0.808) (0.050)b (0.044)b (0.052)b (0.001)c (0.206) (0.826) (0.998) (0.656) 
     
non- 0.143 0.141 -0.092 0.184 0.099 0.148 -0.063 0.099 -0.075 -0.188 0.270 1    
profit (0.316) (0.325) (0.511) (0.186) (0.481) (0.290) (0.652) (0.479) (0.593) (0.177) (0.051)b     
toptier- 0.092 0.031 -0.086 0.196 0.153 0.204 -0.134 0.135 0.061 0.072 0.504 0.322 1   
dummy (0.519) (0.830) (0.540) (0.159) (0.275) (0.144) (0.338) (0.334) (0.666) (0.608) (<.001)c (0.019)b    
bva 0.001 -0.010 -0.224 0.327 0.192 0.449 -0.230 -0.017 -0.147 0.397 0.595 0.183 0.462 1  
 
(0.996) (0.946) (0.106) (0.017)b (0.169) (0.001)c (0.097)a (0.901) (0.295) (0.003)c (<.001)c (0.189) (0.001)c 
  
lnfage -0.087 -0.042 -0.335 0.362 0.039 0.161 0.011 0.056 -0.202 0.954 0.316 -0.119 0.219 0.560 1 
 
(0.542) (0.772) (0.014)b (0.008)c (0.784) (0.250) (0.941) (0.689) (0.147) (<.001)c (0.021)b (0.398) (0.115) (<.001)c 
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(Table 15 continued) 
Panel E: Dependent variables=Cumulative Abnormal Return around SPAC business combination consummation 
 CCAR CCAR CCAR ttdipo ltpmau ltpipou meanm- under- tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet non- toptier- bva lnfage 
  (-1,1) (-2,2) (-5,5)    gtexper. pricing       profit dummy   
CCAR 1                  
(-1,1)                   
CCAR 0.892 1                 
(-2,2) (<.001)c                  
CCAR 0.838 0.806 1                
(-5,5) (<.001)c (<.001)c                 
ttdipo -0.140 -0.165 -0.148 1               
 
(0.336) (0.256) (0.311)    
            
ltpmau 0.280 0.310 0.432 0.059 1              
 
(0.054)a (0.032)b (0.002)c (0.681)   
            
ltpipou 0.345 0.386 0.461 -0.393 0.277 1             
 
(0.015)b (0.006)c (0.001)c (0.004)c (0.049)b  
            
meanm- -0.156 -0.162 -0.199 -0.183 -0.165 -0.220 1            
gtexper. (0.286) (0.267) (0.170) (0.189) (0.248) (0.114)             
under- -0.055 -0.017 0.040 0.068 0.178 0.036 0.222 1           
pricing (0.709) (0.907) (0.784) (0.629) (0.213) (0.800) (0.110)            
tsize -0.168 -0.304 -0.146 0.080 -0.122 -0.334 0.103 0.178 1          
 
(0.250) (0.034)b (0.316) (0.571) (0.395) (0.015)b (0.465) (0.203) 
          
pmba 0.110 0.067 0.034 0.134 0.100 -0.056 -0.122 -0.039 -0.015 1         
 
(0.450) (0.648) (0.815) (0.340) (0.487) (0.689) (0.385) (0.783) (0.913) 
         
pfteam 0.066 0.002 0.116 0.030 0.097 0.054 0.059 0.083 -0.217 -0.061 1        
 
(0.654) (0.991) (0.429) (0.831) (0.499) (0.702) (0.675) (0.557) (0.119) (0.666) 
        
plawacc 0.226 0.204 0.117 0.012 0.079 0.009 -0.149 -0.065 0.037 -0.063 -0.013 1       
 
(0.118) (0.161) (0.424) (0.931) (0.579) (0.952) (0.288) (0.644) (0.792) (0.656) (0.927) 
       
tenure -0.176 -0.183 -0.158 0.001 -0.169 -0.279 0.295 -0.067 0.037 0.106 0.050 -0.190 1      
 
(0.227) (0.210) (0.277) (0.994) (0.236) (0.043)b (0.032)b (0.634) (0.793) (0.450) (0.724) (0.173) 
      
tenhet -0.122 -0.264 -0.005 -0.025 -0.047 -0.270 0.278 0.269 0.450 -0.177 -0.031 0.0004 0.063 1     
 
(0.403) (0.067)a (0.972) (0.857) (0.745) (0.050)b (0.044)b (0.052)b (0.001)c (0.206) (0.826) (0.998) (0.656) 
     
non- -0.225 -0.224 -0.207 -0.118 0.130 -0.092 0.184 0.099 0.148 -0.063 0.099 -0.075 -0.188 0.270 1    
profit (0.121) (0.121) (0.154) (0.401) (0.363) (0.511) (0.186) (0.481) (0.290) (0.652) (0.479) (0.593) (0.177) (0.051)A     
toptier- -0.022 0.012 0.033 -0.276 0.092 -0.086 0.196 0.153 0.204 -0.134 0.135 0.061 0.072 0.504 0.322 1   
dummy (0.879) (0.937) (0.820) (0.046)b (0.522) (0.540) (0.159) (0.275) (0.144) (0.338) (0.334) (0.666) (0.608) (<.001)c (0.019)b    
bva -0.371 -0.452 -0.314 -0.325 -0.210 -0.224 0.327 0.192 0.449 -0.230 -0.017 -0.147 0.397 0.595 0.183 0.462 1  
 
(0.009)c (0.001)c (0.028)b (0.018)b (0.139) (0.106) (0.017)b (0.169) (0.001)c (0.097)a (0.901) (0.295) (0.003)c (<.001)c (0.189) (0.001)c 
  
lnfage -0.201 -0.256 -0.151 -0.039 -0.180 -0.335 0.362 0.039 0.161 0.011 0.056 -0.202 0.954 0.316 -0.119 0.219 0.560 1 
 
(0.167) (0.076)a (0.300) (0.784) (0.205) (0.014)b (0.008)c (0.784) (0.250) (0.941) (0.689) (0.147) (<.001)c (0.021)b (0.398) (0.115) (<.001)c 
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(Table 15 continued) 
Panel F: Dependent variables=Institutional Interest after SPAC business combination announcement or consummation 
 instnc instpc ltpmau ltpipo- meanm- under- tsize pmba pfteam plawacc tenure tenhet non- toptier- bva lnfage 
     mau gtexper. pricing       profit dummy   
instnc 1                
   
  
            
instpc 0.861 1               
 
(<.001)c 
 
  
            
ltpmau 0.360 0.438 1              
 
(0.009)c (0.001)c   
            
ltpipo- 0.122 0.265 0.720 1 
            
mau (0.392) (0.060)a (<.001)c  
            
meanm- 0.077 -0.006 -0.165 -0.284 1            
gtexper. (0.583) (0.966) (0.248) (0.044)b             
under- 0.168 0.165 0.178 0.092 0.222 1           
pricing (0.229) (0.238) (0.213) (0.521) (0.110)            
tsize -0.012 -0.130 -0.122 -0.370 0.103 0.178 1          
 
(0.935) (0.355) (0.395) (0.008)c (0.465) (0.203) 
          
pmba -0.249 -0.187 0.100 0.096 -0.122 -0.039 -0.015 1         
 
(0.072)a (0.181) (0.487) (0.504) (0.385) (0.783) (0.913) 
         
pfteam 0.049 0.087 0.097 0.114 0.059 0.083 -0.217 -0.061 1        
 
(0.729) (0.536) (0.499) (0.427) (0.675) (0.557) (0.119) (0.666) 
        
plawacc 0.012 0.027 0.079 0.213 -0.149 -0.065 0.037 -0.063 -0.013 1       
 
(0.934) (0.847) (0.579) (0.133) (0.288) (0.644) (0.792) (0.656) (0.927 
       
tenure -0.077 -0.036 -0.169 -0.381 0.295 -0.067 0.037 0.106 0.050 -0.190 1      
 
(0.585) (0.799) (0.236) (0.006)c (0.032)b (0.634) (0.793) (0.450) (0.724) (0.173) 
      
tenhet 0.329 0.146 -0.047 -0.250 0.278 0.269 0.450 -0.177 -0.031 0.0004 0.063 1     
 
(0.016)b (0.298) (0.745) (0.076)a (0.044)b (0.052)a (0.001)c (0.206) (0.826) (0.998) (0.656) 
     
non- 0.496 0.317 0.130 0.044 0.184 0.099 0.148 -0.063 0.099 -0.075 -0.188 0.270 1    
profit (<.001)c (0.021)b (0.363) (0.758) (0.186) (0.481) (0.290) (0.652) (0.479) (0.593) (0.177) (0.051)a     
toptier- 0.538 0.410 0.092 -0.055 0.196 0.153 0.204 -0.134 0.135 0.061 0.072 0.504 0.322 1   
dummy (<.001)c (0.002)c (0.522) (0.701) (0.159) (0.275) (0.144) (0.338) (0.334) (0.666) (0.608) (<.001)c (0.019)b    
bva 0.186 0.050 -0.210 -0.353 0.327 0.192 0.449 -0.230 -0.017 -0.147 0.397 0.595 0.183 0.462 1  
 
(0.182) (0.724) (0.139) (0.011)b (0.017)b (0.169) (0.001)c (0.097)a (0.901) (0.295) (0.003)c (<.001)c (0.189) (0.001)c 
  
lnfage 0.011 -0.002 -0.180 -0.438 0.362 0.039 0.161 0.011 0.056 -0.202 0.954 0.316 -0.119 0.219 0.560 1 
 
(0.937) (0.986) (0.205) (0.001)c (0.008)c (0.784) (0.250) (0.941) (0.689) (0.147) (<.001)c (0.021)b (0.398) (0.115) (<.001)c 
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consummation (panel E). Finally, panel F shows the correlations results when dependent variable is 
institutional interest variables after SPAC business combination consummation. 
For panel A, the correlation between meanmgtexper. and ttdipoma is -0.349. The correlation is 
statistically significant within ten percent significance level. As the average industry experience of 
SPAC management team increases, time-to-deal from IPO till business combination decreases. The 
correlation between nonprofit and ttdma or ttdipoma is -0.242 or -0.294 with the statistical significance 
of ten or five percent significance level, respectively. As more SPAC management team members sit 
on non-profit boards, time-to-deal from the announcement till the consummation of SPAC business 
combination or that from IPO till business combination decreases. The correlation between 
toptierdummy and ttdipoma or ttdipo is -0.440 or -0.276, respectively. The correlation is statistically 
significant within five or one percent significance level. As more top-tier underwriters are involved in 
SPAC IPO, time-to-deal from IPO till business combination or that from initial filing till IPO decreases. 
The correlation between bva and ttdipoma or ttdipo is -0.336 or -0.325 with the statistical significance 
within five percent significance level, respectively. As the book value of total assets increases, time-to-
deal from IPO till business combination or that from initial filing till IPO decreases. 
 For panel B, the correlation between meanmgtexper. and ltpipomau or ltpipou is -0.284 or -
0.234 with the statistical significance within ten or five percent significance level. As the average 
industry experience of SPAC management team increases, long-term unit price performance from IPO 
till business combination or that from initial filing till IPO decreases. The correlation between tsize and 
ltpipomau or ltpipou is -0.370 or -0.368 with the statistical significance of one percent significance 
level, respectively. As SPAC management team size increases, long-term unit price performance from 
IPO till business combination or that from initial filing till IPO decreases. The correlation between 
tenure and ltpipomau or ltpipou is -0.381 or -0.288, respectively. The correlation is statistically 
significant within five or one percent significance level. As the tenure of SPAC management team 
increases, long-term unit price performance from IPO till business combination or that from initial 
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filing till IPO decreases. The correlation between bva and ltpipomau or ltpipou is -0.353 or -0.240 with 
the statistical significance within ten or five percent significance level, respectively. As the book value 
of total assets increases, long-term unit price performance from IPO till business combination or that 
from initial filing till IPO decreases. Finally, the correlation between lnfage and ltpipomau or ltpipou is 
-0.438 or -0.345. The correlation is statistically significant within five or one percent significance level. 
As firm age increases, long-term unit price performance from IPO till business combination or that 
from initial filing till IPO decreases. 
For panel C, the correlation between meanmgtexper. and sindicator is 0.269 with the statistical 
significance within one percent significance level. As the average industry experience of SPAC 
management team increases, success indicator increases. Positive correlations are found between 
sindicator and tsize, tenure, nonprofit, toptierdummy, bva or lnfage. The correlations are statistically 
significant within ten, five or one percent significance level. As more than half of success indicator 
consists of SPAC business combination in progress (success indicator=3), the correlation is biased 
towards them. We run multinomial logistic regression with sindicator as a dependent variable to 
further investigate the relationship between management quality and reputation and the success of 
SPAC business combination. 
For panel D, the correlations between cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC business 
combination announcement (ACAR(-1,1) and ACAR(-2,2)) and ltpipou are positive significant. Long-
term unit price performance from IPO till business combination announcement is positively correlated 
with ACAR(-1,1) and ACAR(-2,2) within one percent significance level. The result is consistent with 
our hypothesis 7. The correlation between control variables and ACAR(-1,1), ACAR(-2,2) or ACAR(-
5,5) is statistically insignificant except for that between plawacc and ACAR(-1,1) (They are negatively 
correlated within five percent significance level).  
For panel E, the correlations between cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC business 
combination consummation (CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) and CCAR(-5,5)) and ltpmau or ltpipou are 
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positive significant. Especially, the correlation is significant within one percent significance level 
between ltpipou and CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) and CCAR(-5,5). The long-term unit price performance 
of SPAC IPO is a strong predictor of cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC business combination 
consummation. So, the result is consistent with our hypothesis 7. For control variables, the correlation 
between bva and CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5) is negative significant within five percent 
significance level. Considering the negative firm size effect on the abnormal return of acquisitions 
(Moeller et al. (2004)), the result is consistent with previous literature. 
For panel F, the correlation between between ltpmau and instnc or instpc is positive significant. 
Long-term unit price performance during SPAC business combination process is positively correlated 
with the institutional interest after SPAC business combination consummation. The result is consistent 
with our hypothesis 7. For control variables, consistent with underwriter certification argument 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005)), more reputable underwriters attract more institutional investors after 
SPAC business combination consummation. Also, more management team members who sit on non-
profit organization board leads to higher institutional interest after the consummation of SPAC 
business combination. The result is consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). 
4.13 Factor Analysis: Management Quality, Reputation and the Success of Business 
Combinations 
 
Factor analysis is performed on the characteristics of the success of SPAC business 
combination. We calculated the Team Resources Factor (TRF) and the Team Structure Factor (TSF) as 
we did in section 4.5. Then, we split the characteristics into firm size, TRF and TSF scores. Also, we 
split the characteristics into firm size and management experience. 
Table 16 reports the results of our univariate tests of the relationship between other 
management quality and reputation and SPAC business combination success characteristics (Panel A) 
and between management experience or underpricing and SPAC business combination success 
characteristics (Panel B). We split the sample by TRF and TSF quintiles and by firm size quintiles in 
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Table 16 Variables measuring SPAC business combination success split into firm size, management quality and reputation factor quintiles 
The average values of characteristics of SPAC business combination success variables are provided. Panel A shows ones split into firm size, management quality and reputation factor 
(TRF, TSF) quintiles. Panel B shows ones split into firm size, management experience (meanmgtexper.) quintiles. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. T-test 
results for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively.   
Panel A: Time-to-deal, long-term unit price performance, and success indicator split into firm size and management quality quintiles 
Management Quality Quintiles 
Firm Size Quintiles               TRF                                                                                               TSF                                                                                                                                              
ttdipoma 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 1.653 1.815 2.014 1.827  1.562 1.501 2.100 1.721  
2 1.716 1.687 1.777 1.727  1.857 1.949  1.811 1.872  
3 1.404 1.501 1.384 1.430  1.549 1.725 1.762 1.679  
 1.591 1.668 1.725   1.656 1.725 1.891   
Average     -0.045     -0.377 
     (-0.30)     (-1.75) 
ltpmau 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 -0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0028 -0.0018  -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0012  
2 -0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0026  -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0013  
3 -0.0025 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0020  -0.0054 -0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0037  
 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0025   -0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0025   
Average     0.001     0.002 
     (1.08)     (1.28) 
sindicator 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 2.037 1.588  1.889 1.838  1.500 1.720 2.375 1.865  
2 2.294 2.059 2.300 2.218  2.182 2.158 2.385 2.242  
3 2.333 2.400 2.625 2.453  2.474 2.100 2.667 2.414  
 2.221 2.016 2.271   2.052 1.993 2.476   
Average     -0.208     -0.377 
     (-1.21)     (-2.55)** 
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(Table 16 continued) 
Panel B: Time-to-deal, long-term unit price performance, and success indicator split into firm size and management experience quintiles 
Management Experience Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                                                                                                                                                                                 
ttdipoma 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 1.788 1.772 1.738 1.766  
2 1.914 1.840 1.413 1.722  
3 0.789 1.471 1.461 1.240  
      
Average 1.497 1.694 1.537  0.289 
     (1.89)* 
ttdma 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.785 0.465 0.440 0.563  
2 0.711 0.765 0.825 0.767  
3 0.564 0.622 0.574 0.587  
      
Average 0.687 0.617 0.613  0.872 
     (0.40) 
sindicator 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 1.560 1.867 2.462 1.963  
2 1.909 2.091 2.524 2.175  
3 2.647 2.353 2.474 2.491  
      
Average 2.039 2.104 2.487  -0.509 
     (-2.83)*** 
Underpricing Quintiles 
Firm size quintiles                                                                                                                                                                                                 
ltpmau 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0017  
2 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.0023  
3 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0023  
      
Average -0.004 -0.002 -0.001  -0.003 
     (-2.08)* 
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panel A. Also, we split the sample by management experience or underpricing quintiles and by firm 
size quintiles in panel B. The variables of SPAC business combination success characteristics are 
ttdipoma, ltpmau and sindicator. 
For Panel A, we do not find any statistically significant pattern between management quality 
and SPAC business combination success measures, except for TSF (management quality reputation 
factor) and sindicator (SPAC business combination success dummy). Sindicator is higher for high TSF 
score, and the difference between top and bottom TSF quintiles is statistically significant within five 
percent significance level. As management reputation factor increases, the probability of SPAC 
business combination still in progress increases. As half of SPAC business combination is in progress 
from our sample, SPACs with relatively higher management reputation are still under work for their 
business combination. From our result, we can infer that it is not the whole management quality but a 
certain factor within the quality that affects the success of SPAC business combination. 
 For panel B, we find that high management experience firms are associated with shorter time-
to-deal from IPO till business combination and higher success indicator. The difference between time-
to-deal from IPO till business combination of firms in the top and the bottom management experience 
quintiles is 0.289 within ten percent significance level. Also, the difference between the success 
indicator in the top and the bottom management experience quintiles is -0.509 within one percent 
significance level. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 6. Higher management experience leads 
to higher probability succeeding in SPAC business combination, measured by time-to-deal and long-
term unit price performance. The result implies that management experience is the factor within the 
management quality that affects the success of SPAC business combination. 
We argue that SPAC management quality is valued in the market by SPAC IPO underpricing 
and show the positive relationship between management experience and SPAC IPO underpricing. 
Underpricing reflects the value of management experience. So, we split the sample by underpricing 
and firm size quintiles. As we can see from the result, long-term unit price performance during
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business combination process (ltpmau) increases as SPAC IPO underpricing increases. The difference 
between the ltpmau in the top and the bottom underpricing quintiles is -0.003 within one percent 
significance level. 
The variation of SPAC business combination success indicator (sindicator) across TRF score, 
TSF score or management experience quintiles can be biased towards ones in progress (sindicator=3) 
because it takes up more than half of the total sample. So, we will further investigate the relationship 
between management quality and reputation and success indicator by running multinomial logistic 
regressions.  
4.14 Cross-Sectional Regression of Time to Deal on Management Quality and Reputation or 
SPAC IPO Underpricing 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate the effect of management experience, 
other management quality and reputation or underpricing on time-to-deal in years. The dependent 
variables are time-to-deal in years from IPO till business combination (ttdipoma) and time-to-deal in 
years from the announcement till the consummation of business combination (ttdma). We use censored 
tobit regression. Our base regression model is as follows. 
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… (7) 
where iα  and iε  is constant term and error components. The definition of other variables in 
equation (1) is the same as ones in Table 2 or Table 14. From our base regression model, we add other 
management quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each firm i. Also, we substitute ttdmai for 
ttdipomai as the alternative time-to-deal measure. 
Table 17 shows the censored tobit regression results of the equation (7). T-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively. The 
coefficients of year dummies are not reported.  
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Table 17 Regression results of time-to-deal from IPO filing till M&A consummation on management 
experience, IPO underpricing and management quality 
The censored tobit regression results are provided. Total of 53 observations from September 2004 till May 2008, are used in the 
regression analysis. Dependent variable is time-to-deal in years from the initial filing date of SPAC IPO till the consummation date of 
SPAC business combination (ttdipoma). The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. The regression coefficients of year 
dummies are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents 
the one, five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable=ttdipoma 
intercept 0.622 1.162 1.175 0.892 1.267 
 (1.34) (3.24)*** (3.27)*** (2.28)** (3.29)*** 
meanmgtexper. -0.040 -0.037 -0.038 -0.040 -0.037 
 (-3.82)*** (-3.35)*** (-3.38)*** (-3.61)*** (-3.36)*** 
underpricing 0.254 1.154 1.168 0.942 1.109 
 (0.21) (0.93) (0.95) (0.78) (0.90) 
tsize 0.067     
 (1.93)*     
pmba -0.079  -0.085   
 (-0.43)  (-0.47)   
pfteam 0.424   0.292  
 (2.23)**   (1.56)  
plawacc -0.246    -0.185 
 (-1.01)    (-0.73) 
tenure -0.659     
 (-0.50)     
nonprofit -0.037     
 (-1.42)     
toptierdummy -0.465 -0.539 -0.540 -0.585 -0.520 
 (-2.21)** (-2.64)** (-2.65)** (-2.90)*** (-2.54)** 
bva -0.311 -1.286 -1.345 -0.961 -1.375 
 (-0.30) (-1.47) (-1.53) (-1.09) (-1.57) 
bva2 -1.073 0.601 0.632 0.254 0.709 
 (-0.75) (0.52) (0.55) (0.22) (0.61) 
lnfage 1.944 1.038 1.086 0.990 1.011 
 (0.98) (2.03)** (2.09)** (1.98)** (1.98)** 
      
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.67 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.56 
N 53 53 53 53 53 
 
We find negative relationships between meanmgtexper. and ttdipoma from regression 1 to 
regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within one percent significance level. The 
result is consistent with our hypothesis 6. However, we do not find any relationships between 
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underpricing and ttdipoma. The result is not consistent with our hypothesis 5. In regression 1, one 
standard deviation increase in meanmgtexper. decreases ttdipoma by 18.98%. 
For control variables, we find negative relationships between toptierdummy and ttdipoma from 
regression 1 to regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within five or one percent 
significance level. In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in toptierdummy decreases ttdipoma  
Also, we find positive relationships between lnfage and ttdipoma with the statistical significance 
within five percent significance level from regression 2 to regression 5. In regression 2, one standard 
deviation increase in lnfage increases ttdipoma by 12.23%. It seems that top-tier underwriter 
involvement in SPAC IPO significantly reduces time-to-deal from IPO till business combination. As 
we discussed in earlier sections, firm age can be considered as time to prepare for going public in 
SPAC IPO. If it is correct, positive correlation is expected because time-to-deal starts from IPO initial 
filing period.  
Table 18 shows the censored tobit regression results of the equation (7) with time-to-deal from 
the announcement till the consummation of SPAC business combination (ttdma) as the dependent 
variable. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one percent significance 
level, respectively. The coefficients of year dummies are not reported. 
We find negative relationships between meanmgtexper. and ttdma from regression 1 to 
regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within five percent significance level. The 
result is consistent with our hypothesis 6. However, we do not find any statistical relationships 
between underpricing and ttdipoma even though the signs of coefficients are negative. The result is not 
consistent with our hypothesis 5. In regression 1, one standard deviation increase in meanmgtexper. 
decreases ttdma by 11.55%. 
For control variables, we find negative relationships between toptierdummy and ttdma from 
regression 2 to regression 4. The relationships are statistically significant within ten percent 
significance level. In regression 2, one standard deviation increase in toptierdummy decreases ttdma by  
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Table 18 Regression results of time-to-deal from M&A announcement till M&A consummation on 
management experience, IPO underpricing and management quality 
The censored tobit regression results are provided. Total of 53 observations from September 2004 till May 2008, are used in the 
regression analysis. Dependent variable is time-to-deal in years from the announcement date till consummation date of SPAC business 
combination (ttdma). The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. The regression coefficients of year dummies are not 
reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the one, five and 
ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable=ttdma 
intercept 0.544 0.479 0.479 0.299 0.664 
 (1.22) (1.42) (1.42) (0.81) (1.86)* 
meanmgtexper. -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.025 
 (-2.41)** (-2.36)** (-2.36)** (-2.52)** (-2.39)** 
underpricing -1.864 -1.632 -1.631 -1.752 -1.695 
 (-1.56) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.51) (-1.47) 
tsize 0.012     
 (0.37)     
pmba -0.010  -0.003   
 (-0.05)  (-0.02)   
pfteam 0.231   0.193  
 (1.26)   (1.08)  
plawacc -0.343    -0.327 
 (-1.46)    (-1.39) 
tenure 0.260     
 (0.21)     
nonprofit -0.039     
 (-1.58)     
toptierdummy -0.185 -0.328 -0.328 -0.360 -0.296 
 (-0.91) (-1.70)* (-1.70)* (-1.87)* (-1.55) 
bva 1.690 1.008 1.006 1.226 0.853 
 (1.71)* (1.23) (1.21) (1.47) (1.05) 
bva2 -1.882 -1.051 -1.050 -1.280 -0.859 
 (-1.37) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-1.17) (-0.80) 
lnfage -0.071 0.659 0.660 0.628 0.611 
 (-0.04) (1.38) (1.35) (1.33) (1.30) 
      
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.51 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.40 
N 53 53 53 53 53 
 
8.74%. Also, we do not find any statistical relationships between lnfage and ttdma. Similar to Table 17, 
the average industry experience of SPAC management team and top-tier underwriter involvement in 
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SPAC IPO reduces time-to-deal from the announcement till the consummation of SPAC business 
combination. 
4.15 Cross-Sectional Regression of Long-term Unit Price Performance on Management Quality 
and Reputation or SPAC IPO Underpricing 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to see the relationship between management 
experience, other management quality and reputation or underpricing, and long-term unit price 
performance. The dependent variable is the Fama and Macbeth (1973) regression alpha from the 
regression of monthly average unit return on monthly Carhart (1997) four-factors from the 
announcement till the consummation of SPAC business combination (ltpmau). We use OLS regression. 
Our base regression model is as follows. 
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where iα  and iε  is constant term and error components. The definition of other variables in 
equation (1) is the same as ones in Table 2 or Table 14. From our base regression model, we add other 
management quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each firm i. 
Table 19 shows the OLS regression results of the equation (8). T-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
** represents ten or five percent significance level, respectively. The coefficients of year dummies are 
not reported. 
We find positive relationships between underpricing and ltpmau from regression 1 to 
regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within ten percent significance level. The 
result is consistent with our hypothesis 5. However, we do not find any relationships between 
meanmgtexper. and ltpmau. The result is not consistent with our hypothesis 6. In regression 1, one 
standard deviation increase in underpricing increases ltpmau by 0.07%. For control variables, we find 
positive relationships between toptierdummy and ltpmau from regression 1 to regression 5. The 
relationships are statistically significant within five percent significance level. In regression 1, one 
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Table 19 Regression results of long-term unit price performance from M&A announcement till M&A 
consummation on management experience, IPO underpricing and management quality 
The OLS regression results are provided. Total of 51 observations from September 2004 till May 2008, are used in the regression 
analysis. Dependent variable is unit price performance from the announcement date till consummation date of SPAC business 
combination (ltpmau). It is calculated by running Fama and Macbeth (1973) regression alpha of monthly average unit price on monthly 
Carhart (1997) four factors. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. The regression coefficients of year dummies 
are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the one, 
five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable=ltpmau 
intercept 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 (1.67) (1.63) (1.54) (1.77)* (1.58) 
meanmgtexper. -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.84) (-0.88) (-0.88) 
underpricing 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 
 (1.94)* (1.93)* (1.92)* (1.91)* (1.92)* 
tsize      
      
pmba  0.001    
  (0.39)    
pfteam   -0.0002   
   (-0.18)   
plawacc    -0.001  
    (-0.62)  
tenure      
      
nonprofit     0.00003 
     (0.16) 
toptierdummy 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (2.58)** (2.56)** (2.55)** (2.62)** (2.26)** 
bva 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.58) (0.60) (0.49) (0.45) (0.44) 
bva2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 
 (-1.40) (-1.39) (-1.29) (-1.27) (-1.18) 
lnfage 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.00003 0.0004 
 (0.04) (-0.04) (0.05) (-0.01) (0.10) 
      
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adjusted-R2 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
N 51 51 51 51 51 
 
standard deviation increase in toptierdummy increases ltpmau by 0.11%. We show that there is a 
positive relationship between meanmgtexper. and underpricing by arguing that outside investors value 
SPAC management team experience and it is reflected in underpricing. Also, SPAC IPO underpricing 
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predicts the long-term unit price performance by signaling firm quality. The result is consistent with 
the firm quality signaling theory of IPO underpricing. Also, top-tier underwriter involvement in SPAC 
IPO has positive effect on the long-term unit price performance.  
4.16 Cross-Sectional Regression of the Success Probability in Business Combination on 
Management Quality and Reputation or SPAC IPO Underpricing 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression analysis to see the effect of management experience, other 
management quality and reputation or underpricing on the success probability in business combination. 
The dependent variable is equal to one if SPAC consummated business combination, is equal to two if 
SPAC liquidated, and is equal to three if SPAC business combination is in progress (sindicator). We 
use multinomial logistic regression. Our base regression model is as follows. 
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Λ is the logistic cumulative distribution function. X is a vector of covariates (meanmgtexper., 
stoptierdummy, bva, bva2, lnfage and yeardummy). The definition of other variables in equation (1) is 
the same as ones in Table 2 or Table 14. From our base regression model, we add other management 
quality and reputation variables in Table 2 for each firm i. 
Table 20 shows the multinomial logistic regression results of the equation (9). Z-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, *** represents ten or one percent significance level, respectively. The coefficients of 
year dummies are not reported. We find negative relationships between meanmgtexper. and sindicator 
from regression 1 to regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within ten percent 
significance level. The interpretation is that the probability of choosing consummated SPAC business 
combinations over one in progress decreases as meanmgtexper. increases. The result is consistent with 
our previous analysis in Table 15 and Table 16, but it is not consistent with our hypothesis 6. However, 
we do not find any relationships between underpricing and sindicator. The result is not consistent with 
our hypothesis 5.  
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Table 20 Regression results of success indicator on management experience, IPO underpricing and 
management quality 
The multinomial logistic regression results are provided. Total of 158 observations from September 2004 till November 2008, are used in 
the regression analysis. Dependent variable is equal to one if SPAC consummated business combination, is equal to two if SPAC 
liquidated, and is equal to three if SPAC business combination is in progress (sindicator). The definitions of variables are the same as 
ones in Table 14. The regression coefficients of year dummies are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the one, five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable=sindicator 
intercept 4.642 5.153 4.365 4.333 3.170 
 (3.60)*** (3.71)*** (3.06)*** (3.16)*** (2.03)** 
meanmgtexper. -0.112 -0.113 -0.113 -0.108 -0.109 
 (-2.16)** (-2.17)** (-2.17)** (-2.09)** (-2.08)** 
underpricing 1.965 1.803 1.896 1.925 1.740 
 (0.33) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) 
tsize      
      
pmba  -1.136    
  (-1.15)    
pfteam   0.406   
   (0.41)   
plawacc    0.842  
    (0.61)  
tenure      
      
nonprofit     -0.050 
     (-0.49) 
toptierdummy -3.082 -3.119 -3.117 -3.097 -2.971 
 (-4.34)*** (-4.36)*** (-4.37)*** (-4.34)*** (-3.99)*** 
bva 0.669 0.296 0.807 0.724 0.688 
 (0.32) (0.14) (0.38) (0.35) (0.33) 
bva2 -0.560 -0.472 -0.644 -0.592 -0.570 
 (-0.57) (-0.48) (-0.64) (-0.59) (0.58) 
lnfage -8.170 -8.137 -8.196 -8.172 -8.210 
 (-3.89)*** (-3.92)*** (-3.90)*** (-3.89)*** (-3.84)*** 
      
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 
N 158 158 158 158 158 
 
For control variables, we find negative relationships between toptierdummy, lnsta or lnfage and 
sindicator from regression 1 to regression 5. The relationships are statistically significant within ten or 
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one percent significance level. The interpretation is that the probability of choosing consummated 
SPAC business combination over one in progress decreases as toptierdummy, lnsta or lnfage increases. 
  Overall, it seems that SPAC business combination in progress dominates the sample and the 
result is biased towards sindicator=3.18  
4.17 Cumulative Abnormal Returns or Institutional Interest Split into Firm Size and the Success 
Characteristics of SPAC Business Combination Quintiles 
 
Table 21 shows the relationship between CARs one or two days before and after SPAC 
business combination announcement (ACAR(-1,1), ACAR(-2,2)) and long-term unit price performance 
from IPO consummation till SPAC business combination announcement (ltpipou). We split the sample 
by ltpipou and by firm size quintiles. 
We find positive patterns between long-term unit price performance from IPO consummation 
till SPAC business combination announcement (ltpipou) and cumulative abnormal return one day 
 
Table 21 CARs around SPAC business combination announcement split into firm size quintiles and 
long-term unit price performance quintiles 
The average values of cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC business combination announcement (ACAR(-1,1) and ACAR(-2,2) are 
provided. The table shows ones split into firm size and long-term unit price performance from IPO consummation till SPAC business 
combination announcement (ltpipou) quintiles. T-test results for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** represents ten, five and one percent significance level, respectively.   
Firm Size Quintiles                                                              ltpipou                                                                                                           
ACAR(-1,1) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.055 0.017 0.086 0.053  
2 0.001 0.024  0.155 0.060  
3 0.014 0.068 0.181 0.088  
    
 
 
Average 0.023 0.036 0.141  -0.113 
 
   
 (-3.56)*** 
ACAR(-2,2) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.020 0.014 0.094 0.043  
2 0.022 0.003 0.243 0.089  
3 0.013 0.085 0.160 0.086  
    
 
 
Average 0.018 0.034 0.166  -0.138 
     (-3.27)*** 
 
                                                 
18
 We perform the same analysis without toptierdummy or with the residual from the regression of meanmgtexper. on 
toptierdummy. The results are qualitatively the same. Also, we perform the same regression analysis by substituting 
sdummy (dummy variable equal to one if consummated and zero if liquidated) for sindicator. There is no statistically 
significant relationship between sdummy and management quality or reputation variables. 
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(ACAR(-1,1)) or two days (ACAR(-2,2)) before and after SPAC business combination announcement.  
The difference (-0.113) of ACAR(-1,1) between top and bottom ltpipou quintiles is statistically 
significant within one percent significance level (t-statistic=-3.56). Also, the difference (-0.138) of 
ACAR(-2,2) between top and bottom ltpipou quintiles is statistically significant within one percent 
significance level (t-statistic=-3.27). As long-term unit price performance from IPO consummation till 
SPAC business combination announcement increases, cumulative abnormal return one day or two days 
before and after SPAC business combination announcement increases.  
The result is consistent with our hypothesis 7. Higher success probability of SPAC business 
combination, measured by the long-term unit price performance, is positively correlated with better 
SPAC business combination performance, measured by cumulative abnormal returns.  
Table 22 shows the relationship between time-to-deal from IPO initial filing till IPO 
consummation (ttdipo) and CARs one, two or five days before and after SPAC business combination 
consummation (CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5)). We split the sample by ttdipo quintiles and 
by firm size quintiles. 
We find a negative pattern in the relationship between ttdipo and CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or 
CCAR(-5,5), even though the difference of cumulative abnormal returns between top and bottom ttdipo 
quintiles is not statistically significant. The results imply IPO period predicts the performance of SPAC 
business combination around consummation date. Also, the result is consistent with our hypothesis 7. 
Less time to deal from IPO initial filing till IPO consummation is negatively correlated with better 
SPAC business combination performance, measured by cumulative abnormal returns, around 
consummation date. 
Table 23 shows the relationship between long-term unit price performance from SPAC 
business combination announcement till consummation (ltpmau) or from IPO consummation till SPAC 
business combination announcement (ltpipou) and CARs one, two or five days before and after SPAC
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Table 22 CARs around SPAC business combination consummation split into firm size and time-to-
deal quintiles 
The average values of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around SPAC business combination consummation (CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-
2,2) and CCAR(-5,5)) are provided. CARs are split into firm size and time-to-deal from IPO initial filing till IPO consummation (ttdipo) 
quintiles. T-test results for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and one 
percent significance level, respectively.   
Time-to-deal Quintiles (from IPO initial filing till IPO consummation)  
Firm size quintiles                                                                    ttdipo                                                                                                                       
CCAR(-1,1) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.026 0.107 0.049 0.061  
2 0.002 -0.061 -0.110 -0.056  
3 -0.019 -0.145 -0.092 -0.085  
      
Average 0.003 -0.033 -0.051  0.031 
     (0.80) 
CCAR(-2,2) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.028 0.106 0.041 0.058  
2 -0.009 -0.054 -0.065 -0.043  
3 -0.009 -0.136 -0.202 -0.116  
      
Average 0.003 -0.028 -0.075  0.022 
     (0.48) 
CCAR(-5,5) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.027 0.124  -0.005 0.049  
2 -0.007 -0.058 -0.098 -0.054  
3 -0.019 -0.107 -0.093 -0.073  
      
Average 0.0003 -0.014 -0.065  0.057 
     (1.30) 
 
business combination consummation (CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5)). We split the sample 
by ltpmau or ltpipou quintiles and by firm size quintiles. 
We find a positive relationship between ltpmau or ltpipou and CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or 
CCAR(-5,5). The difference (-0.062; -0.096; -0.142) of CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5) 
between top and bottom ltpmau quintiles is statistically significant within ten percent (t-statistic=-2.03) 
or one (t-statistic=-3.71; t-statistic=-6.10) percent significance level, respectively. Also, the difference 
(-0.130; -0.158; -0.158) of CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5) between top and bottom ltpipou 
quintiles is statistically significant within five percent (t-statistic=-2.61; t-statistic=-2.83) or one (t-
statistic=-3.27) percent significance level, respectively. Better long-term unit price performance during 
SPAC business combination period or post-IPO period leads to higher cumulative abnormal returns 
around SPAC business combination consummation. Again, the result is consistent with our hypothesis 
7 and previous literature about merger-driven IPO.   
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Table 23 CARs around SPAC business combination consummation split into firm size and long-term unit price performance quintiles 
The average values of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around SPAC business combination consummation (CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) and CCAR(-5,5)) are provided. CARs are split 
into firm size and long-term unit price performance from SPAC business combination announcement till SPAC business combination consummation (ltpmau) or from IPO consummation 
till SPAC business combination announcement (ltpipou) quintiles. T-test results for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and 
one percent significance level, respectively.   
Long-term Unit Price Performance Quintiles 
Firm Size Quintiles                                ltpmau                                                                                                                       ltpipou 
CCAR(-1,1) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 -0.036 0.041 0.108 0.038  0.114 0.004 0.079 0.066  
2 -0.091 -0.008 -0.071 -0.057  -0.115 -0.030  -0.006 -0.050  
3 -0.114 -0.033 -0.068 -0.072  -0.122 -0.078 0.017 -0.061  
 -0.080 0.000 -0.010   -0.041 -0.035 0.030   
Average     -0.062     -0.130 
     (-2.03)*     (-2.61)** 
CCAR(-2,2) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 -0.009 -0.008 0.120 0.034  0.114 0.012 0.070 0.065  
2 -0.109 0.025 -0.036 -0.040  -0.104 -0.019 0.007 -0.039  
3 -0.117 -0.105 -0.031 -0.084  -0.169 -0.065 0.045 -0.063  
 -0.078 -0.029 0.018   -0.053 -0.024 0.041   
Average     -0.096     -0.158 
     (-3.71)***     (-2.83)** 
CCAR(-5,5) 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 -0.048   -0.029  0.112 0.012  0.174 -0.020 0.044 0.066  
2 -0.131 -0.009 0.033 -0.036  -0.159 -0.050 0.074 -0.045  
3 -0.132 -0.032 0.001 -0.054  -0.134 -0.022 0.028 -0.043  
 -0.104 -0.023 0.049   -0.040 -0.031 0.049   
Average     -0.142     -0.158 
     (-6.10)***     (-3.27)*** 
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Finally, Table 24 shows the univariate analysis result between long-term unit price 
performance from SPAC business combination announcement till consummation (ltpmau) or from IPO 
consummation till SPAC business combination consummation (ltpipomau) and the number of 
institutional investors (instnc) or the ratio of institutional ownership to IPO offering amount (instpc) at 
the end of the first quarter after SPAC business combination consummation. We split the sample by 
ltpmau or ltpipomau quintiles and by firm size quintiles. 
We find positive patterns in the relationship between ltpmau or ltpipomau and instnc or instpc. 
The difference (-12.53) of instnc between top and bottom ltpmau quintiles is statistically significant 
within ten percent significance level (t-statistic=-1.84). On the other hand, the difference (-8.65) of 
instnc between top and bottom ltpipomau quintiles is not statistically significant (t-statistic=-1.22) even 
though the positive pattern shows in the relationship between ltpipomau and instnc. The difference (-
0.54; -0.45) of instpc between top and bottom ltpmau or ltpipomau quintiles is statistically significant 
within five or ten percent significance level (t-statistic=-2.36; t-statistic=-1.99). As long-term unit price 
performance from SPAC business combination announcement till consummation or from IPO 
consummation till SPAC business combination consummation increases, the institutional interest after 
SPAC business combination consummation increases. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 7.  
Overall, the results from Table 21 to Table 24 show that shorter time-to-deal or better unit price 
performance leads to better SPAC business combination performance measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns. Also, better unit price performance leads to more institutional interest after business 
combination consummation. The results are consistent with our hypothesis 7 and previous merger-
driven IPO literature. However, some of the results are not statistically significant even though their 
relationship pattern is consistent with our hypothesis 7. So, we perform regression analysis from Table 
25 to Table 28 to verify our findings here. 
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Table 24 Institutional interest after SPAC business combination split into firm size and time-to-deal or long-term unit price performance 
quintiles 
The average institutional interest after SPAC business combination is provided. The table shows the number of institutional investors at the end of the first quarter after SPAC business 
combination consummation (instnc) or the ratio of the institutional ownership to IPO unit offering amount at the end of the first quarter following SPAC business combination 
consummation (instpc) split into firm size and long-term unit price performance from IPO consummation till SPAC business combination consummation (ltpipomau) or from business 
combination announcement till consummation (ltpmau) quintiles. T-test results for the difference in means are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five and 
one percent significance level, respectively.   
Long-term Unit Price Performance Quintiles 
Firm Size Quintiles                ltpmau                                                                                      ltpipomau 
instnc 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 2.67 3.40 10.00 5.36  0.00 4.00 9.63 4.54  
2 8.43 10.29 23.75 14.16  9.57 9.57  23.00 14.05  
3 12.57 8.60 38.60 19.92  11.67 23.00 30.00 21.56  
 7.89 7.43 24.12   7.08 12.19 20.88   
Average     -12.53     -8.65 
     (-1.84)*     (-1.22) 
instpc 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 1 2 3 Average 1st-3rd 
1 0.18 0.20 0.57 0.32  0.00 0.24 0.55 0.26  
2 0.36 0.30 1.17 0.61  0.43 0.19 1.25 0.62  
3 0.43 0.27 1.21 0.64  0.34 1.01 0.86 0.74  
 0.32 0.26 0.98   0.26 0.48 0.89   
Average     -0.54     -0.45 
     (-2.36)**     (-1.99)* 
 
 82 
4. 18 Cross-Sectional Regressions of CARs or Institutional Interest around or after SPAC 
Business Combinations on Long-term Unit Price Performance or Time-to-Deal 
 
Table 25 shows the OLS regression results of cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC 
business combination announcement (ACAR) on the long-term unit price performance from IPO 
consummation till SPAC business combination announcement (ltpipou). Cumulative abnormal return 
is calculated following Brown and Warner (1985). Event window for abnormal return is (-1,1), (-2,2) 
and (-5,5). T-statistics are in the parentheses. *, **, *** represents ten, five or one percent significance 
level, respectively. The coefficients of year dummies are not reported. N represents the number of 
observations.  
We find positive relationships between ltpipou and ACAR(-1,1) or ACAR(-2,2). The 
relationships are statistically significant within one percent significance level. One standard deviation 
increase in ltpipou increases ACAR(-1,1) by 7.43% and ACAR(-2,2) by 8.58%. Long-term unit price 
performance from IPO consummation till SPAC business combination announcement is positively 
correlated with SPAC business combination announcement return. 
Table 26 shows the OLS regression results of cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC 
business combination consummation (CCAR) on time to deal from IPO initial filing till IPO 
consummation (ttdipo). 
Consistent with the pattern we find in Table 22, we find negative relationships between ttdipo 
and CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5). The relationships are statistically significant within five 
percent significance level. One standard deviation increase in ttdipo decreases CCAR(-1,1) by 5.23%, 
CCAR(-2,2) by 5.31% and CCAR(-5,5) by 5.28%. Longer time to deal from IPO initial filing till IPO 
consummation leads to lower announcement return in SPAC business combination consummation. 
Table 27 shows the OLS regression results of cumulative abnormal returns around SPAC 
business combination consummation (CCAR) on long-term unit price performance from SPAC 
business combination announcement till consummation (ltpmau) or from IPO consummation till the 
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Table 25 Regression results of CARs around SPAC business combination on the long-term unit price 
performance 
The OLS regression results are provided. Total of 51 observations (from September 2004 till May 2008) are used in the regression 
analysis. Dependent variables are cumulative abnormal return around SPAC business combination announcement (ACAR). Event 
windows are (-1,1) and (-2,2). The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. The regression coefficients of year dummies 
are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the one, 
five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 
   
Dependent Variable ACAR ACAR 
 (-1,1) (-2,2) 
intercept -0.001 -0.042 
 (-0.01) (-0.25) 
ltpipou 29.330 33.903 
 (5.27)*** (4.43)*** 
meanmgtexper. -0.004 -0.006 
 (-1.35) (-1.69) 
underpricing -0.253 -0.528 
 (-0.83) (-1.26) 
tsize -0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.31) (-0.17) 
pmba 0.034 0.034 
 (0.74) (0.54) 
pfteam 0.048 0.057 
 (1.02) (0.89) 
plawacc -0.104 -0.082 
 (-1.66)* (-0.95) 
tenure -0.102 -0.490 
 (-0.31) (-1.10) 
nonprofit 0.009 0.009 
 (1.37) (1.03) 
toptierdummy 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.08) (-0.11) 
bva 0.001 0.273 
 (0.00) (0.76) 
bva2 0.068 -0.374 
 (0.19) (-0.75) 
lnfage 0.242 0.938 
 (0.50) (1.40) 
   
yeardummy Yes Yes 
   
Adjusted-R2 0.46 0.36 
N 51 51 
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Table 26 Regression results of CARs around SPAC business combination consummation on time-to-
deal from IPO announcement till IPO consummation 
The OLS regression results are provided. Total of 49 observations from September 2004 till May 2008 are used in the regression analysis. 
Dependent variables are cumulative abnormal return around SPAC business combination consummation (CCAR). Event window is (-1,1), 
(-2,2) and (-5,5), respectively. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. The regression coefficients of year dummies 
are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the one, 
five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 
    
Dependent Variables CCAR (-1,1) CCAR (-2,2) CCAR (-5,5) 
    
intercept -0.022 0.181 0.031 
 (-0.11) (0.80) (0.14) 
ttdipo -0.116 -0.118 -0.117 
 (-2.21)** (-2.04)** (-2.06)** 
meanmgtexper. 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.22) (-0.24) (-0.69) 
underpricing 0.280 0.871 0.511 
 (0.44) (1.26) (0.75) 
tsize 0.014 0.003 0.019 
 (0.85) (0.17) (1.07) 
pmba 0.008 -0.034 -0.036 
 (0.10) (-0.39) (-0.41) 
pfteam -0.039 -0.055 0.009 
 (-0.45) (-0.58) (0.09) 
plawacc 0.063 0.073 -0.032 
 (0.57) (0.61) (-0.27) 
tenure 0.237 0.913 -0.030 
 (0.40) (1.40) (-0.05) 
nonprofit 0.014 0.004 0.010 
 (1.04) (0.30) (0.66) 
toptierdummy -0.046 0.064 -0.028 
 (-0.48) (0.60) (-0.27) 
bva -1.705 -1.123 -1.434 
 (-3.03)*** (-1.81)* (-2.35) 
bva2 1.746 1.015 1.350 
 (2.40)** (1.27) (1.71) 
lnfage 0.006 -1.071 0.518 
 (0.01) (-1.09) (0.54) 
    
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adjusted-R2 0.16 0.21 0.14 
N 49 49 49 
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Table 27 Regression results of CARs around SPAC business combination consummation on long-term 
unit price performance 
The OLS regression results are provided. Total of 49 observations from September 2004 till May 2008 (48 observations for regression 1, 
3 and 5) are used in the regression analysis. Dependent variables are cumulative abnormal return around SPAC business combination 
consummation (CCAR). Event window is (-1,1), (-2,2) and (-5,5), respectively. The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 
14. The regression coefficients of year dummies are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** represents the one, five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
   
   
Dependent  CCAR CCAR CCAR CCAR CCAR CCAR 
Variables (-1,1) (-1,1) (-2,2) (-2,2) (-5,5) (-5,5) 
 
   
   
intercept -0.030 -0.178 0.185 0.037 -0.044 -0.187 
 
(-0.13) (-0.81) (0.72) (0.15) (-0.19) (-0.85) 
ltpmau 18.951  22.116  36.255  
 
(1.65)  (1.79)*  (3.28)***  
ltpipou  19.802  18.054  29.257 
 
 (2.00)*  (1.65)  (2.93)*** 
meanmgtexper. 0.002 0.004 0.0001 0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 
 
(0.49) (0.80) (0.01) (0.28) (-0.49) (-0.06) 
underpricing -0.099 -0.192 0.498 0.406 -0.080 -0.028 
 
(-0.15) (-0.31) (0.68) (0.59) (-0.12) (-0.04) 
tsize -0.002 0.011 -0.015 -0.0001 0.00002 0.018 
 
(-0.10) (0.68) (-0.77) (-0.01) (0.00) (1.07) 
pmba -0.005 0.033 -0.049 -0.011 -0.071 0.002 
 
(-0.06) (0.41) (-0.53) (-0.13) (-0.87) (0.02) 
pfteam -0.042 -0.036 -0.062 -0.054 0.042 0.015 
 
(-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.57) (-0.56) (0.43) (0.17) 
plawacc 0.040 0.112 0.047 0.117 -0.042 0.047 
 
(0.35) (0.97) (0.37) (0.91) (-0.38) (0.41) 
tenure 0.304 0.121 0.998 0.806 0.047 -0.199 
 
(0.49) (0.20) (1.50) (1.21) (0.08) (-0.33) 
nonprofit 0.003 0.012 -0.007 0.002 -0.010 0.008 
 
(0.21) (0.85) (-0.46) (0.11) (-0.66) (0.56) 
toptierdummy -0.048 -0.029 0.056 0.084 -0.066 -0.021 
 
(-0.47) (-0.30) (0.51) (0.78) (-0.67) (-0.22) 
bva -1.405 -1.446 -0.843 -0.851 -0.977 -1.209 
 
(-2.29)** (-2.63)** (-1.28) (-1.40) (-1.65) (-2.17)** 
bva2 1.670 1.571 0.993 0.828 1.186 1.215 
 
(2.06)** (2.16)** (1.14) (1.03) (1.51) (1.65) 
lnfage -0.273 0.122 -1.397 -0.974 0.154 0.726 
 
(-0.29) (0.13) (-1.39) (-0.97) (0.17) (0.79) 
 
   
   
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
   
   
Adjusted-R2 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.28 0.23 
N 48 49 48 49 48 49 
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announcement of SPAC business combination (ltpipou).  
We find positive relationships between ltpmau and CCAR(-2,2) or CCAR(-5,5). The 
relationships are statistically significant within one or ten percent significance level. One standard 
deviation increase in ltpmau increases CCAR(-2,2) by 5.67% and CCAR(-5,5) by 9.29%. Also, we find 
positive relationships between ltpipou and CCAR(-1,1) or CCAR(-5,5). The relationships are 
statistically significant within ten or one percent significance level. One standard deviation increase in 
ltpipou increases CCAR(-1,1) by 5.26% and CCAR(-5,5) by 7.77%. Long-term unit price performance 
from SPAC business combination announcement till consummation or from IPO initial filing till IPO 
consummation is positively correlated with the announcement return of SPAC business combination 
consummation. 
For control variables, firm size measured by the book value of assets at the time of IPO (bva) 
has negative relationships with CCAR(-1,1), CCAR(-2,2) and CCAR(-5,5) in regression 1, 2 and 6. The 
relationships are significant within five percent significance level. Larger firms tend to have lower 
abnormal return around SPAC business combination consummation. The result is consistent with 
previous literature (Moeller et al., 2004).  
Table 28 shows the censored tobit regression results of the ratio of institutional ownership to 
IPO offering amount at the end of the first quarter following SPAC business combination 
consummation (instpc) or the number of institutional investors at the end of the first quarter following 
SPAC business combination consummation (instnc) on long-term unit price performance from SPAC 
business combination announcement till consummation (ltpmau) or from IPO consummation till SPAC 
business combination consummation (ltpipomau). 
Also, we find positive relationships between ltpmau or ltpipomau and instnc or instpc. The 
relationships are statistically significant within ten, five or one percent significance level. One standard 
deviation increase in ltpmau increases instnc by 619.50% and instpc by 21.81%. One standard 
deviation increase in ltpipomau increases instnc by 862.96% and instpc by 27.39%. Long-term unit  
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Table 28 Regression results of institutional interest after SPAC business combination on long-term unit 
price performance 
The censored tobit regression results are provided. Total of 51 observations from September 2004 till May 2008 are used in the 
regression analysis. Dependent variables are the number of institutional investors at the end of the first quarter after SPAC business 
combination consummation (instnc) and the ratio of institutional ownership to IPO unit offering amount at the end of the first quarter 
after SPAC business combination consummation (instpc). The definitions of variables are the same as ones in Table 14. The regression 
coefficients of year dummies are not reported in the regression. N represents the number of observations. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represents the one, five and ten percent significance level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Dependent 
Variables instnc instnc instpc instpc 
     
intercept 17.583 6.562 0.969 0.660 
 (0.83) (0.29) (1.12) (0.70) 
ltpmau 2150.102  75.700  
 (2.82)***  (2.42)**  
ltpipomau  5234.24  166.115 
  (2.59)**  (1.99)* 
meanmgtexper. -0.246 -0.244 -0.012 -0.013 
 (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.69) (-0.70) 
underpricing 48.874 46.847 2.546 2.616 
 (0.87) (0.81) (1.11) (1.10) 
tsize -2.952 -2.328 -0.086 -0.067 
 (-1.89)* (-1.44) (-1.35) (-1.00) 
pmba -13.572 -13.093 -0.514 -0.492 
 (-1.78)* (-1.70)* (-1.65) (-1.54) 
pfteam -8.043 -6.586 -0.172 -0.130 
 (-0.93) (-0.74) (-0.48) (-0.35) 
plawacc 6.779 7.226 0.062 0.066 
 (0.66) (0.69) (0.15) (0.15) 
tenure -3.667 -26.707 1.039 0.229 
 (-0.07) (-0.48) (0.45) (0.10) 
nonprofit 3.063 2.774 0.064 0.054 
 (2.81)*** (2.49)** (1.42) (1.19) 
toptierdummy 27.200 30.318 0.969 1.100 
 (2.95)*** (3.34)*** (2.57)** (2.94)*** 
bva -5.865 0.815 0.259 0.519 
 (-0.12) (0.02) (0.13) (0.26) 
bva2 11.452 -8.840 -0.564 -1.337 
 (0.17) (-0.13) (-0.21) (-0.49) 
lnfage -8.210 29.477 -1.414 -0.107 
 (-0.10) (0.35) (-0.41) (-0.03) 
     
yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
LR 45.12 44.13 29.43 27.77 
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.27 
N 51 51 51 51 
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price performance from SPAC business combination announcement till consummation (ltpmau) or 
from IPO till SPAC business consummation (ltpipomau) is positively correlated with the institutional 
interest around SPAC business combination announcement or consummation. 
Overall, our regression analysis results manifest our findings in univariate analysis from Table 
21 to Table 24 and our hypothesis 7. Time-to-deal or unit price performance during IPO and business 
combination period has positive effects on the announcement return around SPAC business 
combination event. Also, better SPAC unit price performance during IPO and business combination 
period attracts higher institutional interest. The results are also consistent with merger-driven IPO 
literature.  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper empirically investigates the market value of management experience and its 
relationship with SPAC IPO underpricing or the success of SPAC business combination. First, we find 
that the market value of SPACs consists of proceeds in trust account and management quality which is 
measurable. 
Second, we find that the average management experience of SPACs signal firm quality so that 
they attract more outside investors and induce larger offer size. Also, it is not management quality 
itself but management reputation outside business community that induces larger offer size for SPAC 
IPO. As more management team members sit on non-profit board or more outside directors are 
involved in the team, more top-tier underwriters are involved in SPAC IPO. Underwriting spread 
decreases as SPAC management team size increases, and other offering expenses decreases as SPAC 
management team size, tenure, average management team experience or the number of non-profit 
boards that team members sit on increases. The average management experience and management 
team size of SPACs are valued by the IPO market by signaling firm quality as a form of SPAC IPO 
underpricing. Finally, management team size is important factor in attracting institutional investors in 
SPAC IPO. 
Thrid, we find negative relationships between the average SPAC management team experience 
and time-to-deal in years from IPO till business combination or that from the announcement till 
consummation of business combination. We find positive relationships between underpricing and long-
term unit price performance from the announcement till consummation of business combination.  
So, SPAC management team experience or SPAC IPO underpricing positively affects the success of 
SPAC business combination. The result is consistent with the argument of underpricing as a firm 
quality signal. 
Finally, we empirically investigate the effect of time-to-deal or long-term SPAC unit price 
performance on SPAC business combination performance or institutional interest around or after the 
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business combination. We find that shorter time-to-deal or better long-term unit price performance 
from IPO till business combination leads to higher cumulative abnormal return around SPAC business 
combination announcement or consummation. Also, better long-term unit price performance attracts 
more institutional interest after the consummation of SPAC business combination.  
The result implies that IPO price performance before business combination resolves the 
valuation uncertainty of IPO firms. Also, the resolved valuation uncertainty increases the probability of 
success in business combination and leads to better return performance around business combination. 
Finally, institutional investors appreciate the valuation certainty and increase their investment in 
merged firms. The result is consistent with the uncertainty resolution hypothesis of merger-driven IPO 
literature (Lyandres, Zhdanov and Hsieh, 2008; Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani, 2008).    
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